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CHAPTER 1: GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
 
The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), established by the United 
Nations Security Council
1
 was originally set to wind up its affairs in 2010. However, 
by Resolution 1901 of the Security Council, ICTR‟s mandate has been extended to 
2012.
2
 This will necessitate the transfer of residual cases to national courts for trial 
after it has closed.
3
 Rwanda considers itself a suitable candidate for referral, and 





Transfer of cases at the ICTR, is governed by Rule 11 bis of ICTR Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence
5
 which lays down a number of requirements that a country 
requesting a transfer has to fulfil. On the face of it, Rwanda has failed this test as the 
ICTR has rejected all five applications. On the part of Rwanda, a legal framework 
that mirrors Rule 11 bis, has been adopted to cover the accused persons who will be 
transferred from the ICTR (hereinafter, transferees).
6
 Some of the guarantees 
provided by this framework, however, may not apply to all accused persons on trial 
in Rwanda (the locally accused persons)
7
 although the transfer of cases should have 
come to cure the inequalities that exist under the concurrent jurisdiction.  
 
This thesis analyses the differential treatment of the accused persons (the transferees 
and the locally accused) before Rwandan courts promoted under the legal regime on 
                                                          
1
 United Nations Security Council Resolution no. S/Res/ 955(1994) (hereinafter, Resolution 955) 
establishing the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. Also see Article 1 of the ICTR Statute.  
2
 United Nations Security Council Resolution no. S/RES/1901(2009) at para 1. 
3
 See United Nations Security Council Resolution no. S/RES/1503 (2003) (hereinafter, Resolution 
1503). 
4
 See Prosecutor v Yussufu Munyakazi Case no. ICTR-97-36-R11 bis; Prosecutor v Kanyarukiga 
Case no. ICTR 2002-78-Rule 11 bis; Prosecutor v Ildephonse Hategekimana Case No. ICTR-00-55B-
R 11 bis ; Prosecutor v Fulgence Kayishema Case no. ICTR – 01-67- R11 bis; and Prosecutor v Jean 
Baptiste Gatete Case No. ICTR 2006-61 R11 bis. 
5
  ICTR Rules of Procedure and Evidence as amended on 14 March 2008 (hereinafter ICTR Rules of 
Procedure).  
6
 See provisions of the Organic Law No 11/2007 of 16/03/2007 Concerning the Transfer of Cases to 
the Republic of Rwanda from the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and Other States 
(hereinafter, the law on transfer of cases). 
7
 The phrase „other locally accused‟ or „other accused persons‟ in this thesis refers to all persons 











transfer of cases (hereinafter, the LTC), juxtaposed to ICTR‟s goals of punishment. 
This will be done by examining both international and national laws so as to 
determine whether such differentiation is justified or not (that is whether it amounts 
to discrimination).  It is however important, to point out that the LTC does uphold 
the ICTR mission in some respect, by guaranteeing the right to a fair trial for the 
transferees. The position of this thesis is that while guaranteeing such rights to the 
transferees, they should be extended to other accused persons in Rwanda. Matters of 
fair trial rights are however not the main discussion in this thesis as they have been 
amply covered in the ICTR decisions on transfer of cases some of which are 
discussed in Chapter two of this thesis but the inequality promoted therein, is the 
focus of this discussion. 
 
Most criminologists rightly argue that any sentencing institution should have reasons 
or goals when punishing offenders so that it does not just punish for the sake of it.
8
 It 
is therefore important for this research to examine the impact of differential 
treatment promoted under the LTC, on deterrent and reconciliation as some of the 
goals of punishment envisioned by both the ICTR and Rwanda in punishing 
perpetrators of particularly serious international crimes including genocide.  
 
The ICTR‟s goals may be summed up to be: prosecuting perpetrators of genocide – 
(this can be referred to as retributive goals) and other violations of international 
humanitarian law thereby „ensuring that such violations are halted and effectively 
redressed‟, as well as restoration and maintenance of peace and national 
reconciliation in Rwanda.
9
  The ICTR sought to deter future offenders by taking 
effective measures to bring to justice persons responsible for the serious human 
rights violations.
10
   
 
 
                                                          
8
 See Jeremy Bentham „Punishment and Deterrence‟ in Andrew Von Hirsh et al „Principled 
sentencing: Readings on Theory and Policy‟ 3
rd
 ed (2009) 53 – 56 at 55; Emil Durkheim „What is a 
Social Fact? and Rules for the Observation of Social Facts‟ in the Rules of the  Sociological Method 
(1938); Ceaser Bacarria „On Crimes and Punishments‟ in John Muncie et al (eds) „Criminological 
Perspectives: A Reader 12‟(1996). 
9
 See Prosecutor v Nahimana Case No. ICTR 99-52-T at para 109. Also see Resolution 955 (n 1) at 
para 7. 
10
  See Prosecutor v Vincent Rutiganda Case no. ICTR-96-T at para 56. Also see Resolution 955 (n 1) 













I.  The origin and development of transfer of cases 
 
Rwanda made international media headlines in 1994 when nearly a million people 
were killed in just 100 days.
11
  The Hutu dominated government instigated the 
genocide which targeted mainly Tutsis and moderate Hutus although the massacre 




The brutality of the massacres did not only stimulate the new government into 
developing laws and establishing institutions to adjudicate and punish perpetrators, 
but also galvanized the international community into working towards ending 
impunity and ensuring that victims got justice. Thus, three transitional justice 
processes were put in place: the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), 
the National Genocide Trials (NGTs) and the Gacaca Courts.
13
 The ICTR tries those 
bearing the highest responsibility.
14
 At the national level, genocide suspects are put 
into three categories: category one (those bearing the highest criminal 
responsibility), categories two and three cover those bearing less and the least 
responsibility.
15
 In the beginning, category one offenders were tried by NGTs, 
                                                          
11
 United Nations „Lessons from Rwanda: the United Nations and Prevention of Genocide.‟ Available 
at: http://www.un.org/preventgenocide/rwanda/neveragain.shtml [accessed on 10/09/2009]. The 
United Nations gives a brief account of the genocide: „The genocide had been part of a long time plan 
by the successive regimes after 1959 when many Tutsis fled the country due to the massacres 
organised by extreme Hutu regime. Thus, the minority ethnic Tutsis living in exile, in the neighboring 
countries sought to return to Rwanda in the 1980s, but were prevented from doing so by the majority 
ruling Hutu. The Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), a largely Tutsi rebel army invaded Rwanda in 1990, 
forcing their way to return. Tutsis in Rwanda were arrested and harassed as accomplices of the 
invasion. Extremist radio and print media depicted all Tutsis as helping the invading force… A plane 
carrying President Habyarimana was shot down on 6 April 1994, triggering the start of the genocide.‟ 
12
 Timoth Gallimore „The Legacy of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) and its 
Contributions to Reconciliation in Rwanda‟ (2008) 14 2 New England Journal of International and 
Comparative Law 239 - 263 at 240. 
13
 Philip Kasaija „Procedural Due Process and the Prosecution of Genocide Suspects in Rwanda‟ 
(2009) 11 1 Journal of Genocide Research at11. The three processes have concurrent jurisdiction but 
the ICTR has primacy over the national processes. Also see article 8of the ICTR Statute (n 1). 
14
  See UN Doc.S/2003/946 at para 6. 
15
 Article 51 of Organic Law no.16/2004 of 19/06/2004 Establishing the Organisation, Competence 
and Functioning of Gacaca Courts Charged with Prosecuting and Trying Perpetrators of the Crime of 
Genocide and Other Crimes Against Humanity Committed between 1
st
 October 1990 and 31
st
 
December 1994(hereinafter, 2004 Gacaca law). This article elaborates on the categories of genocide 
perpetrators tried by Rwandan courts: 
Category one include: a) persons whose criminal acts or whose criminal acts of participation place 
them among the planners, organizers, instigators, supervisors and leaders of the crime of genocide or 











whereas category two and three offenders were indicted in the Gacaca Courts.
16
  
However, a recent organic law has expanded jurisdiction of the Gacaca Courts to 




Crucially, this novel form of concurrent jurisdiction has given rise to disparities in 
the treatment and punishment of accused persons, an anomaly that has partly 
motivated this study. Trials at international tribunals generally tend to foster unequal 
sentencing where developing countries are involved. As Madeline points out, 
accused persons appearing before international courts are held in better facilities than 
those processed in national courts: International tribunals are expected to ensure that 
defendants‟ rights are protected while national courts may struggle to guarantee this 
protection due to resource constraints.
18
 In addition, judges in the international 
tribunals use their overarching discretionary powers to impose lenient sentences on 
convicted persons.
19
 I will argue that the arbitral use of these powers results in 
unequal sentences for the two sets of accused persons. Madeline Morris supports this 
view and states that: 
 
Under the stratified-concurrent jurisdiction model, all of those advantages go to the 
leaders, those who were at the helm of the holocaust. This surely is an unintended 
and an unjust outcome. Yet, these “anomalies of inversion,” in which the most 
responsible defendants get the least harsh treatment, are not coincidental; they are a 
predictable, structural problem that will be recurrent under the stratified-concurrent 
                                                                                                                                                                    
communal, sector or cell level, or in a political party, who fostered such crimes; c) notorious 
murderers who by virtue of the zeal or excessive malice with which they committed atrocities, 
distinguished themselves in their areas of residence or where they passed; d) persons who committed 
acts of  torture though did not result into death, together with her his accomplices; e) persons who 
committed acts of rape or torture against sexual organs together with their accomplices; f) persons 
who committed dehumanizing acts on dead body/ies together with their accomplices. Category two: 
a) a persons whose criminal acts or criminal participation place them among killers or who committed 
acts against others causing death, together with their accomplices; b) persons who injured or 
committed other acts of serious attack with the intention to kill but did not attain his goal or objective, 
together with her objective; c) persons who committed or aided to commit other offences but without 





Article 9 of the Organic Law no.13/2008 of 19/05/2008 Amending 2004 Gacaca law (hereinafter, 
the 2008 Gacaca law). 
18
 Morris H Madeline „The Trials of Concurrent Jurisdiction: The Case of Rwanda‟ (1997) 7 Duke 
Journal of Comparative and International Law 349-374 at 371. 
19
 Mark A Drumbl „Collective Violence and Individual Punishment: The Criminality of Mass 











jurisdiction model, in which the international tribunal tries the leaders and the 




Although Madeline speaks of ills of concurrent jurisdiction in general, they are more 
attuned to situations involving international tribunals on one hand, and national 
courts in developing countries on the other hand, where resources are scarce. A 
similar situation exists in the context of the Rwandan genocide trials. 
 
Such inequalities, especially the different penalty structure and location of the ICTR 
had formed basis for objections by the Government of Rwanda during negations that 
preceded the establishment of the tribunal.
21
 But these objections were ignored and 
the ICTR was located in Arusha, Tanzania and a different penalty structure was put 
in place. This thesis however, is not concerned with concurrent jurisdiction hence, 
will not further this discussion. 
 
Nonetheless, it is important to discuss the implications of the Security Council 
decision to close down the ICTR and, the subsequent transfer of cases to the national 
justice systems.
22
 This led to the formulation of Completion Strategy documents and 
the transfer of cases to national competent jurisdictions to complete cases that had 
been slated for the ICTR to hear.
23
 Note that transfer of cases had not been envisaged 
when resolution 955 establishing the ICTR was passed as will later be discussed. 






                                                          
20
 Madeline (n 18) at 371. 
21
 Amelia S Canter „“For these Reasons, the Chamber: Denies the Prosecutor‟s Request for Referral.” 
The False Hope of Rule 11 Bis‟ (2009) 32 Fordham International Law Journals Fordham University 
School of Law 1614 – 1656 at 1619. 
22
 Resolution 1503 (n 3). 
23
 Ibid. In this resolution it was indicated that cases involving intermediate and lower-rank accused 
were to be transferred to competent national jurisdictions as appropriate, to allow the ICTR to 











II.  Statement of the Problem 
 
The ICTR requires „minimum standards‟ to be met by Rwanda and any other United 
Nations member State; interested in trying these cases before any transfer can be 
effected.
24
 As mentioned earlier, all requests made by the ICTR Prosecutor to refer 
cases to Rwanda, have been rejected on the basis that these requirements have not 
been met.
25
 As a result, some western countries hosting genocidaires have also 




Rwanda has however reformed its legal framework to specifically cover transfers, 
built a new prison (of international standards),
27
  abolished the death penalty,
28
 and 
built new court rooms. These initiatives and many more, seem to satisfy 
requirements of Rule 11bis, which are plausible efforts on the part of Rwanda. 
 
However, discrimination which is patently intrinsic in the parallel process could 
unfold in these efforts. The LTC seems to accord preferential treatment to transferees 
as opposed to other locally accused persons. This is a violation of the fundamental 
right to equality and non- discrimination protected by the Constitution of the 
Republic of Rwanda and other laws both national and international as will be 
discussed in Chapter three of this work. I further contend that, by according 
preferential treatment to the transferees, the LTC fails in its efforts to deter future 
offenders and to reconcile Rwandan people yet; these are indispensable for the 
attainment of lasting peace in Rwanda.  
                                                          
24
 Article 11 bis of ICTR Rules of Procedure (n 5).  
25
 See all ICTR decisions on referral (n 4).  
26
 The New Times Editorial: no.1851 (09/07/2009). Available at: www.newtimes.co.rw [accessed on 
09/07/2009]. In this newspaper, it was reported that different countries refused to extradite genocide 
fugitives due to ICTR‟s decisions on transfer of cases. The New Times specified that it Switzerland 
refused to extradite a suspect - Gaspard Ruhumuriza, former minister of Environment to Rwanda, by 
referring to ICTR decisions on referral. 
27
 See Kanyarukiga‟s Trial Chamber Decision on Prosecutor‟s Request for Referral to the Republic of 
Rwanda at para 91, the chamber pointed out that: „[I]t follows from the submissions of the Republic 
of Rwanda that a new prison has been built in Mpanga. It has a special wing with 73 cells built to 
international standards. Budgetary appropriations have been earmarked and are available to complete 
the partitioning of the cells to meet requirements set by the ICTR. The Mpanga prison is situated in 
Nyanza, about two hours drive from Kigali. During trial, the accused will be detained at a custom-
built remand facility at the Kigali Central Prison, in close proximity to the High Court and the 
Supreme Court. It contains twelve cells and six toilets. Each room is equipped with a bed, beddings, 
closet, reading table and a chair.‟ 
28












Questions this thesis poses and seeks to answer are:  
 
 Does the application of different standards on the accused [transferees and 
those locally accused], respect the principle of equality of all before the law?  
 
 Can the situation be reversed without jeopardizing efforts to transfer accused 
persons from Arusha, given its importance to the Rwandan people?  
 
 Should transfer, be a ground to justify discrimination under international law 
and domestic law?; and  
 
 Lastly, will differentiation of accused promoted under the LTC, achieve 
deterrent and reconciliatory goals? 
III. Significance of the study 
 
The importance of this study to Rwanda given its troubled history cannot be 
overemphasised. The fractious and adverse effects of the 1994 genocide are still 
fresh in the minds of the population hence any attempt at understanding and 
fostering methods of preventing any future flare-up of a similar magnitude is 
important to the nation. It is thus necessary to bring to the fore, weaknesses and gaps 
in the LTC and in the concurrent jurisdiction as discussed earlier in Section II of this 
Chapter to punish and deter like-minded people from going on a similar killing spree 
and aide reconciliation. Also, the international community would benefit from the 
study and ensure that similar loopholes do not occur should it become necessary to 
mount a similar process in future. 
IV. Hypothesis 
 
The LTC discriminates against locally accused persons by according better treatment 
to transferees. This does not deter offenders of „high crimes‟ such as the transferees, 












V.  Objectives 
 
In view of the gaps identified, the objectives of this research, inter-alia, include:  
 
 To provide anticipatory analysis of the likely implications of the current 
arrangement of the transfer of cases; 
 
 To show the likely adverse effects resulting from this arrangement; and 
 
 To provide any possible suggestions on the way forward. 
 
VI.  Methodology 
 
This thesis mainly consists of library- based data and relies heavily on Rwandan 
laws, ICTR cases and various books and articles on the subject. The study adopted 
both critical and comparative approaches where the treatment of the transferees, was 
compared to that of the locally accused.  
VII. Delimitations of the study 
 
This research analyses transfers from the ICTR to Rwandan courts thereby analysing 
decisions on the requests for referral; assesses the principle of equality under both 
international and Rwandan law, and highlights discrepancies created by the LTC. It 
is, however, not concerned with extraditions from other jurisdictions, nor does it 
discuss fair trial matters. It examines the impact of LTC on the principle of equality, 
deterrence and reconciliation.  
VIII. Literature review 
 
The subject of transfer of cases from the ICTR to national jurisdictions has recently 
attracted a considerable amount of comment in academic literature and a number of 
articles have been written on the subject. In spite of this, it has not been easy to find 
literature with a direct bearing on the subject under discussion. There is little analysis 











addressing the impact of transfers on equality, deterrence and reconciliation 
specifically on Rwanda. However, there is an abundance of case law, journals, 
articles and internet sources.  
 
Timothy Gallimore‟s article, assesses the legacy of the ICTR; and asserts that the 
tribunal has contributed to reconciliation in Rwanda in five major ways: creating a 
factual account of genocide judicial history, affirming that there was genocide 
against the Tutsi, establishing individual criminal responsibility, giving voice to the 
victims, and providing re-education and communication to promote respect for 
human rights and rule of law in Rwanda.
29
   
 
Although the ICTR‟s real contribution to reconciliation is postulated and expected, 
Gallimore did not consider the effect of the differential treatment of the ICTR 
accused and other locally accused persons before Rwandan courts. Thus, this thesis 
shows how reconciliation and other goals may be hindered by transfers under LTC 
due to differentiation of the accused.  Gallimore further provides an important 
explanation on how to achieve deterrent goals. He posits that, mimetic structures of 
violence that are embedded in the minds of people in places where massive violence 
occurred should be attacked if deterrent goals are to be achieved.
30
 He explains that 
mimetic structures may happen if „perpetrators of genocide especially leaders who 
are among the ICTR convicts, become public heroes or gain notoriety among the 





It is the position of this thesis that, transfer of cases to Rwandan domestic justice 
system, should be carried out and trials conducted in a manner that destroys such 
structures. This is because leaders, who were planners and initiators of genocide, 
were admired and respected by the population. This made it easy for them to 
entrench genocide ideology into the masses to commit such acts thus, if they are 
brought to trial and punished equally in Rwanda, it is hoped that, similar acts of 
violence would never recur. 
                                                          
29
  Gallimore (n 12) at 239. 
30














Zorbas Eugenia interrogates what Rwandans understand by reconciliation with the 
official government‟s discourse on the concept through an empirical research in the 
Southern part of Rwanda.
32
 Her findings reveal areas of both overlap and divergence 
between what she referred to as „public‟ and „hidden transcripts.‟ She asserted that 
there were inconsistencies and hence cautioned against the likelihood of achieving 
contrary results.
33
 Informative as Zorba‟s research may be, just like Gallimore, she 
does not concern herself with how differential treatment of the accused may also 
hinder reconciliation nor does she concern herself with the impact of disparities in 
punishment of the accused on reconciliation. Her audience or participants are 
obviously guided by her research questions which eluded things to do with transfer 
of cases, the actual role of the ICTR in reconciling people and differential treatment 
of the accused and transfer of cases. 
 
Lars Waldorf‟s article, examines the tensions between the Rwandan government‟s 
discourse on reconciliation and its fight against negationism.
34
 He warns that, the 
broad definition and application of genocide ideology would have a negative impact 
on reconciliation. Importantly for this thesis, he points to concerns raised by Human 
Rights Watch on the transfer of one accused – Gaspard Kanyarukiga.
35
 Furthermore, 
this thesis shows other grounds based on decisions by the ICTR judges to deny 
referrals to Rwanda.  
 
The classical works of Jeremy Bentham
36
 informs the study about reasons for 
deterrence as a theory of punishment. Bentham explains what deterrence means and 
the type/s of punishment that would achieve it.
37
 However, the concern is whether 
deterrence will be achieved in case of transfer of cases while sentencing procedures 
and laws (LTC) discriminate among the accused. This kind of analysis stems from 
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the ICTR‟s and Rwanda‟s established aims/reasons for punishment which include 
deterring future offenders, among others. 
 
Warwick McKean in his book „Equality and discrimination under international 
law,‟
38
 defines the principle of equality and provides its historical development from 
the time of Aristotle, to the time of writing his book. He affirms the indispensability 
of the right to equality in any society especially those that subscribe to the principles 
of democracy.
39
 Warwick analyses classical cases on equality; for instance, the South 
West Africa case which was brought before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in 
1966.
40





Judge Tanaka‟s position was that, the principle of equality qualified as a „general 
principle of law‟ and on its application he was of the view that it required treating 
what is equal, equally and differently what is different. He [Judge Tanaka] also 
negated the idea of formal or mechanical equality.
42
 The position of this thesis is 
similar to Warwick‟s and Judge Tanaka‟s dissenting opinion which is that 
substantive rather than mechanical equality should be promoted. 
 
Oddný Mjöll Arnardóttir‟s book, analyses the principle of equality and non – 
discrimination under European system of Human Rights.
43
 She advocates for a more 
sophisticated understanding of the principle in the provisions of the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and to a large extent her arguments are based 
on an analysis of the case law of the European Court on Human Rights (ECtHR) on 
Article 14 of the ECHR and Protocol 12 to the convention. Her stance is that the 
„objective and reasonable justification‟ test and the traditional treatment of the 
principle in the scholarly literature are not apt with the new emerging possibilities in 
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the protection against discrimination or explaining the variations in the strictness of 




Though Mjöll deals with the principle of equality and non- discrimination in the 
European perspective, her analysis greatly informs this study on the understanding of 
the principle and circumstances under which differential treatment may be justified.  
 
Similarly, the Interights‟ handbook for practitioners
45
 enriches the researcher‟s 
understanding of the principle of equality and non-discrimination under international 
law. It clarifies the ambiguity that usually exists when distinguishing discrimination 
from other forms of differential treatment that are justified. This greatly helps the 
study to analyse the LTC as in to whether its differentiation amounts to 
discrimination or is a justified differential treatment of the accused. The hand book 
however, is too general in its analysis as it analyses equality and non- discrimination 
in all aspects and under international law. This study in some respect, its analysis of 
the principle narrows to Rwandan law and to the LTC where the groups of analysis 
are the transferees in comparison with other accused before Rwandan courts. 
 
Amelia S Canter‟s article
46
 is valuable for the understanding of the subject of 
transfer of cases from the ICTR. She examines reasons given in two ICTR decisions 
on transfer. She assesses Munyakazi‟s (both in trial and appeals chamber) and 
Kanyarukiga‟s cases and highlights the confusion within the ICTR as to the level of 
trust which should be afforded to Rwanda.
47
 Canter argues that „the ICTR must give 
Rwanda a greater leeway within its Rule11 bis decisions, both to underscore the 





I agree with Canter‟s suggestion that Rwanda be given „a greater leeway‟ due to the 
importance and contribution the transfers would have on Rwandan society. She 
however points out that Rwanda faces certain, potentially insurmountable, problems 
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in guaranteeing a fair trial which according to her Rwanda cannot fix and the ICTR 
cannot „turn a blind eye to.
49
 She thus concludes that, the ICTR is promising the 
impossible by holding out that it may transfer cases to Rwanda in future it meets 
what is required in face of such impasse. The researcher is however more optimistic 
than Canter on what Rwanda can do to overcome its problems evidence being the 
reforms so far as mentioned above although it has come with unequal treatment of 
the accused. Judging from the decisions on transfers so far, one may be bound to 
agree with Canter on the point that, the ICTR may be promising the impossible to 
Rwanda. 
 
Further, ICTR decisions on requests for transfer
50
 not only inform the research with 
the Tribunal‟s views on requirements of Rule 11 bis but also expose the confusion in 
the ICTR on the criteria followed to transfer a case; and on the scope and context of 
application of Rule 11 bis. Rwandan laws also contribute richly to this work, 
especially the LTC as they are the basis of this research. 
 
Despite the plausible works on the ICTR and transfer of cases in particular, it is 
notable that the topic on transfer of cases and its impact on equality, deterrence and 
reconciliation on the Rwandan population has not been discussed by scholars. Thus, 
it is the reason for consideration of this subject as novel domain of research.  
IX.  Overview of chapters 
 
Chapter one introduces the study and the context in which it is set. It highlights the 
basis and structure of the study. Chapter two discusses legal and political issues 
surrounding the transfer of cases, its importance, and reasons behind it. It also 
analyses ICTR decisions on transfers. Chapter three analyses the right to equality 
and non – discrimination under international, regional and Rwandan law. It further 
discusses states‟ negative and positive obligations to ensure the right to equality. It 
also highlights circumstances under which a state may be justified to treat people in 
similar situations, differently. Chapter four analyses the LTC in view of the 
treatment it accords transferees in comparison with other locally accused persons. 
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Thus, it asses temporal jurisdiction of ICTR visa avis that of Rwanda and what it 
means for the transferees and other accused; competency of court; composition of 
the bench; indictment; evidence collection; right to counsel; witness protection; 
sentences and conditions of detention. Chapter five highlights general implications 
of the LTC on ICTR goals of punishment. Emphasis is put on what it implies for 
reconciliation, deterrence and equality. It also consists of a summary of the 
































This chapter discusses legal and political issues surrounding the transfer of cases, 
specifically the basis for the transfers, the importance and reasons behind transfers, 
and critically analyses ICTR decisions on requests for transfers that have so far been 
made. This analysis helps in showing how and why the LTC evolved.  
 
II.  Basis for the transfer of cases from the ICTR 
 
The ICTR Statute does not explicitly provide for the transfer of cases but judges 
amended the ICTR‟s Rules of Procedure in 2002, to include provisions enabling 
transfers
51
  for reasons that are discussed in the next section. Rule 11 bis provides for 
the criteria followed by a trial chamber designated to refer a case/s to authorities of a 
state: 
 
A) If an indictment has been confirmed, whether or not the accused is in the custody 
of the 
Tribunal, the President may designate a trial chamber which shall determine whether 
the case should be referred to the authorities of a State: 
(i) in whose territory the crime was committed; or 
 
(ii) in which the accused was arrested; or 
 
(iii) having jurisdiction and being willing and adequately prepared to accept 
such a case, so that those authorities should forthwith refer the case to the 
appropriate court for trial within that State. 
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(B) The Trial Chamber may order such referral proprio motu or at the request of the 
Prosecutor, after having given to the Prosecutor and, where the accused is in the 
custody of the Tribunal, the accused, the opportunity to be heard. 
 
(C) In determining whether to refer the case in accordance with paragraph (A), the 
Trial Chamber shall satisfy itself that the accused will receive a fair trial in the courts 
of the 
State concerned and that the death penalty will not be imposed or carried out. 
 
(D) Where an order is issued pursuant to this Rule: 
 
(i) the accused, if in the custody of the Tribunal, shall be handed over to the 
authorities of the State concerned; 
 
(ii) the Trial Chamber may order that protective measures for certain 
witnesses or victims remain in force; 
 
(iii) the Prosecutor shall provide to the authorities of the State concerned all 
of the information relating to the case which the Prosecutor considers 
appropriate and, in particular, the material supporting the indictment; 
 
(iv) the Prosecutor may send observers to monitor the proceedings in the 
courts of the State concerned on his or her behalf. 
 
(E) The Trial Chamber may issue a warrant for the arrest of the accused, which shall 
specify the State to which he is to be transferred for trial. 
 
(F) At any time after an order has been issued pursuant to this Rule and before the 
accused is found guilty or acquitted by a court in the State concerned, the Trial 
Chamber may, at the request of the Prosecutor and upon having given to the 
authorities of the State concerned the opportunity to be heard, revoke the order and 












(G) Where an order issued pursuant to this Rule is revoked by the Trial Chamber, it 
may make a formal request to the State concerned to transfer the accused to the seat 
of the Tribunal, and the State shall accede to such a request without delay in keeping 
with Article 28 of the Statute. The Trial Chamber or a Judge may also issue a 
warrant for the arrest of the accused. 
(H) An appeal by the accused or the Prosecutor shall lie as of right from a decision 
of the Trial Chamber whether or not to refer a case. Notice of appeal shall be filed 
within fifteen days of the decision unless the accused was not present or represented 
when the decision was pronounced, in which case the time-limit shall run from the 




In deciding whether to refer a case, relevant trial chambers have to satisfy 
themselves that the accused/transferee will receive a fair trial, and that death penalty 
will not be imposed as punishment if convicted.
53
 The ICTR judges are here given a 
new role by Rule 11bis (C) ); of not only applying international criminal law, but 
also of deciding on issues outside its purview such as assessing whether a national 
system is equipped to conduct a fair trial.  
 
Note that before applying for a referral, the ICTR office of the Prosecutor reviews an 
alleged status and extent of participation of the accused in the crimes, the connection 
that the accused may have with other cases, as well as the availability of evidence 
and investigative material for transmission to the relevant domestic courts.
54
 Thus, 
transfer of cases stems from Rule 11 bis of ICTR Rules of Procedure. 
 
Prior to the adoption of Rule 11 bis, it is important to point out that, the ICTR 
followed the ICTY‟s example and adopted an exit strategy and the transfer of cases, 
is part of it. The ICTY came up with a completion strategy, which it presented to the 
Security Council in 2000.
55
 The strategy advanced two points: the tribunal was to 
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concentrate on the prosecution and trial of the most senior leaders, and would 
transfer other cases involving intermediate and low – ranked accused to domestic 
courts.
56
 The Security Council welcomed the proposal because it seemed to ease 
budgetary concerns constraining the international community, and hence encouraged 
the ICTR to make a similar plan.
57
 
In 2003, the ICTR submitted a completion strategy report to the Security Council 
modelled on that of the ICTY and set similar deadlines for completion of its 
activities.
58
 The Security Council endorsed the ICTR‟s completion strategy through 
resolution 1503 and urged the tribunal to complete all its trials by 2008.  
 
However, there was and still is, a lot of scepticism about ICTR meeting this deadline 
as it later requested for an extension to 2012 as discussed in Chapter one. The 
scepticism is also due to the weight of the outstanding workload and the number of 
unaccountable for fugitives. There are growing fears that the tribunal would need 
more time to clear its backlog than its allotted timeframe.
 59
 The scepticism is also 
bolstered by the facts that only two referrals have been completed so far; no country 
other than Rwanda itself, seem to be interested in the transfers; and ICTR seeming 
not ready to transfer cases to Rwanda as indicated in the five requests. The latter will 
be expanded on, in a section below. 
 
The Security Council through resolution 1534 demanded that, twice a year, the 
tribunal provide an overview of the progress on implementation of the completion 
strategy.
60
 This further compelled the ICTR to make more efforts in finding 
countries interested in receiving its cases.  According to resolution 1503, all 
countries which ratified the Genocide Convention, and had national legislation 
harmonised, could start receiving cases from these tribunals. Importantly, the 
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Security Council pointed out that Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia should 




III. Why transfer cases  
 
First of all, the ICTR is an ad hoc tribunal. Although the Security Council that 
established the ICTR did not set a time frame for it to finish its work, the fact that it 
was an ad hoc tribunal meant that; it‟s „lifespan was short.‟
62
 Thus transferring cases 
to national jurisdictions is a plausible way of winding up the work of the tribunal. 
Secondly, the budget of the ICTR, like that of the ICTY, was becoming burdensome 
to the member countries
63
 and thus the tribunal was forced to wind up its work 
because countries were starting to prioritise other areas for finance. The international 
community became increasingly impatient with the ad hoc tribunals for focusing on 
low ranking offenders rather than concentrating on those who bore the greatest 
responsibility for the genocide. The tribunals were accused of being slow and 
inefficient.
64
 Thus formulating exit strategies through which intermediate and low- 
ranked offenders would be transferred to national jurisdictions was a response to 
such demands. 
 
Furthermore, cases are transferred from international tribunals to national 
jurisdictions due to the advantages expected: transferring cases to national 
jurisdictions is aimed at achieving educational and general deterrence goals. For 
instance, in Prosecutor v Bagaragaza
65
 one of the arguments advanced by the ICTR 
Prosecutor to exclude Rwanda as a country of destination was that a strong public 
policy favoured the involvement of other countries in the prosecution of the accused, 
as a manner of educating people in other countries on the lessons learned from the 
Rwandan genocide and would promote the development of ideas to prevent similar 
tragedies. I would however argue that, the ICTR ought to test educational and 
deterrent goals through transfer of cases to Rwanda first, since it is the victim state 
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before targeting other countries.  The transfer of cases would also achieve deterrence 
on the national level because mimetic structures of violence discussed by Gallimore 
are destroyed.
66
 Those who planned the genocide will be punished in their home 
area; hence will cease to be „heroes‟ to the population.  
 
The transfer of cases to Rwanda may achieve reconciliatory goals. It should be 
recalled that, the Rwandan population especially survivors of genocide, have always 
been disgruntled about the fact that they do not see their perpetrators being punished 
due to the location of the tribunal;
67
  as such, the transfer of cases would enable them 
to see their perpetrators tried and thus accelerate reconciliation process. The general 
perception in Rwanda on the transfer and what this can do in as far as reconciliation 
is concerned is demonstrated in the extract from one of the Rwanda‟s leading 
newspaper: 
 
The process of arresting and trying Genocide suspects is not just a 
justice-craving thing for Rwandans, as has been repeatedly pointed out in 
various fora. It is also a process of reconciliation, of forgiving and 
uniting. It is a process that wants to unravel all the dirt that took place in 
1994, and subsequently put it behind…. So, the trial of Genocidaires is 
more than a trial to Rwandans on their road to understanding one another, 
and for putting up strong enough barriers to withstand any other gusts of 
genocide ideology. That is why it is important to all Rwandans that the 
pending cases be brought here so that justice is not only done, but is seen 




The above position is supported by Cherif Bassiouni as he argues that the goal of 
international criminal justice is not exclusively the internationalization of criminal 
justice but rather the nationalization of the Process.
69
 He further posits that, 
international justice rendered by international tribunals ought to translate into 
sustainable national justice systems capable of continuing international/mixed 
efforts. Mark Drumbl adds that international criminal law interventions - such as 
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those of the ICTR, would do well to engage with practices that actually reflect 
customs, mores and procedures of those affected by the violence.
70
 The researcher 
concurs with Bassiouni that failure to translate into national systems, the ICTR and 
ICTY will not leave any legacy to national systems.
71
 Efforts to transfer cases 
however, could be one way of doing so. 
 
In addition, nationalisation of the international criminal justice as suggested by 
Bassiouni entails strengthening of national jurisdictions. This was also recommended 
by Resolution 1503 and was considered crucial to the rule of law by the Security 
Council.
72
  Paragraph one of Resolution 1503, calls upon the international 
community to assist national jurisdictions in improving their capacity to prosecute 
cases transferred from the ad hoc tribunals. By this, it is evident that national 
jurisdictions may benefit from these efforts geared towards completion strategies 
which will in the end enable them to try other cases in their own jurisdictions. This 
cannot be possible if ICTR continues to hesitate to refer cases. An offshoot of the 
refusal of transfers would be that Countries like Rwanda will not benefit from the 
ICTR‟s experience and expertise in adjudication of international crimes which would 
be crucial when dealing with genocide cases. 
 
 Transfers may also give legitimacy to the work of the ICTR. Nils Christie posits that 
„the root problem of the system is that conflicts were stolen from their legitimate 
owners, the victims, and became the property of professionals rather than people‟.
73
 
Drumbl also finds it paradoxical, for a society „reeling from violence to be 
disenfranchised from the redressing of that violence which, instead, becomes a task 





Justice rendered by the ICTR from Arusha risks to be labelled as described by 
Drumbl and Christie. Transfers may however reverse this because Rwanda, as a 
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victim state may be given the opportunity to fully own all decisions from genocide 
trials. Through the transfers, victims of genocide will have more access to ICTR‟s 
past and present work unlike when in Arusha, Transfers, kind of bring the conflict 
back to its „owners‟ – Rwandans, who should  resolve it.   
 
As Cassese argues, the best judicial forum for prosecution of crimes is the court of 
the territory where crimes have been committed.
75
 Reasons for prosecution to take 
place in the territory where crimes were committed include : „the crime has breached 
the values and legal rules of the community existing in that territory, and has 
offended against the public order of that community; it is there that the victims of 
crime or relatives normally live; it is there that all, or at least most, evidence can be 
found; the trial is conducted in the language normally shared by the defendant, his 
defence, the prosecutor and the court;‟
76
 and the international criminal tribunals take 
excessive length proceedings
77
 hence prosecution should be there. This is also based 
on the „territoriality principle‟ – a state has a right to prosecute and try crimes 
committed on its territory.
78
   Thus, the above reasons may have influenced the 
decision of transferring cases from the ad hoc tribunals, to national jurisdictions.  
IV.  Requests for transfer 
 
This section analyses ICTR decisions on the Prosecutor‟s request for transfer of 
cases to national courts. It analyses decisions in each case and reasons for denial or 
granting the request.  
1. Prosecutor v Micheal Bagaragaza 
 
The first attempt to transfer a case from the ICTR was made in 2006 - in Prosecutor 
v Micheal Bagaragaza.
79
 The country of destination identified by the ICTR 
Prosecutor was Norway. However, the trial chamber found no material jurisdiction
80
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despite defence‟s argument in favour of the transfer.
81
 Note that Rwanda at this time 
also considered itself eligible for the transfer but the chamber considered the ICTR 
Prosecutors‟ position and declared that it was not.
82
 The main point of contention 




Subsequently, the Netherlands was identified as a country of destination to receive 
Michael Bagaragaza‟s case and transfer was in fact granted by the ICTR‟s trial 
chamber stating its satisfaction on all areas of concern as spelt out in Rule 11 bis.
84
  
The Netherlands however, later withdrew its interest to try Bagaragaza and declared 
that it had no jurisdiction to try the transferee for genocide. The ICTR Prosecutor 




The Dutch Prosecutor in a letter to the ICTR supported the Prosecutor‟s request for 
revocation by referring to a decision of a District Court in The Hague in a case of 
Joseph Mpambara of 24
th
 July 2007 in which it (the district court) stated that, it did 
not have jurisdiction to try him for genocide.
86
 The Dutch Prosecutor thus argued 
that he had intended to assert same jurisdictional bases to try Bagaragaza for 
genocide as it had for Mpambara and as a result of that decision [Mpambara‟s]; it 
suspended proceedings against Bagaragaza.
87
 This was rather strange given the 
informed judges‟ justification and satisfaction in the chamber that had granted the 
request for referral of Bagaragaza to the Netherlands. Another strange thing in these 
proceedings for revocation is the defence‟s arguments. The defence opposed 
revocation of the case from the Netherlands and motivated that its concerns were the 
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Although the chamber dismissed such fears as being speculative, it is an indication 
of the preconception defence has on Rwanda. This is because at that point, the 
chamber was not deciding on whether to refer the accused to Rwanda but on 
revocation, nor was the ICTR Prosecutor requesting for it, it‟s as though the defence 
would rather have the accused tried/transferred anywhere else, but not Rwanda 
irrespective of whether there is jurisdiction to try such accused or not. 
2. Prosecutor v Laurent Bucyibaruta & Prosecutor v Wenceslas 
Munyeshyaka 
 
It took the ICTR Prosecutor more than a year, after Bagaragaza‟s case to make other 
requests for transfer. The prosecutor requested that Laurent Bucyibaruta
89
 and 
Wenceslas Munyeshyaka be transferred to France.
90
 These requests were granted 
with ease and no much struggle on part of France, unlike Rwanda as discussed 
below. 
3. Prosecutor v Yusufu Munyakazi 
 
The first case to be decided upon for referral to Rwanda was that involving Yusufu 
Munyakazi.
91
 The trial chamber in Munyakazi raised three concerns as basis for 
denial of the referral; the trial chamber feared that the accused would not be tried by 
an independent and fair court if transferred to Rwanda because of the system of a 
single judge.
92
 It argued that international crimes such as those the suspect was 
accused of, are not supposed to be tried by a single judge and that if that was allowed 
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Secondly, Munyakazi Trial Chamber was not satisfied that the penalty structure in 
Rwanda was adequate as it feared that the accused would be sentenced to life 
imprisonment in isolation as provided in the Law on the abolition of the death 
penalty which in the chambers opinion was applicable to the transferees as well.
94
 
Rwanda and the prosecution contested this view stating that transferees were 
governed by the law on transfer of cases which provided that the maximum 
punishment is life imprisonment and not life imprisonment with special measures. 
However, the chamber was not convinced that such kind of punishment would not 
apply to Munyakazi.  
 
Lastly, the Trial Chamber was not convinced that the accused‟s right to a fair trial; to 
obtain the attendance of, and to examine defence witnesses under the same 




The Appeals Chamber upheld the Trial Chamber‟s decision on the penalty structure 
and witness protection
96
 but questioned and reversed the decision on the 
independence of the judiciary and held that it is not necessary to have more than one 
judge for a trial to be fair.
97
 Clearly, divergent views emerge at this point over what 
constitutes a fair trial in the ICTR for cases to be referred. 
4. Prosecutor v Gaspard Kanyarukiga 
 
Another case that was considered for referral to Rwanda was that of Gaspard 
Kanyarukiga.
98
 Kanyarukiga Trial Chamber, just like that of Munyakazi‟s before it, 
was not satisfied that the indictee would receive a fair trial if referred to Rwanda. 
Thus raised three concerns: 
 
i) that Kanyarukiga would not be able to call witnesses residing outside 
Rwanda to the extent and in a manner which would ensure a fair trial;  
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ii) that the defence would face problems in obtaining witnesses residing in 
Rwanda because they would be afraid to testify; and  
 
iii) that there is a risk that Kanyarukiga, if convicted to life imprisonment in 
Rwanda, may risk solitary confinement.
99
   
 
The Appeals Chamber dismissed all grounds of appeal and upheld trial chambers 
decision.
100
 The plausible issue in Kanyarukiga‟s chambers is that they overcame 
confusion that existed in Munyakazi‟s chambers on the composition of the bench in 
relation to a fair trial. The chambers did not find a single judge system problematic 
and hindrance to a fair trial. 
 
5.  Prosecutor v Ildephonse Hategekimana 
 
The ICTR Prosecutor also requested for the referral of Ildephonse Hategekimana‟s 
case to Rwanda.
101
 Just like the previous chambers before, it had concerns on 
witness protection, the accused risking life imprisonment in isolation, and lack of a 
robust legal framework to criminalise command responsibility under Rwandan 
law.
102
 The last concern raised is rather new, compared to concerns raised by other 
chambers before. The Trial Chamber noted that Hategekimana‟s amended indictment 
sought to hold him responsible for individual criminal responsibility under article 
6(1) and for command responsibility under article 6(3) of the ICTR Statute for 
crimes of genocide, or alternatively, complicity in genocide, as well as murder and 
rape as crimes against humanity.
103
   
 
The chamber however noted that the Rwandan Penal code provides for the 
prosecution of principal perpetrators and accomplices for instigation, preparation and 
planning, commission, direct and public incitement, provision of instruments or 
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other assistance to principal perpetrators, and for harbouring or aiding perpetrators 
which in the chamber‟s understanding, covers crimes under Article 6(1) of the ICTR 
Statute but note those under Article 6(3).
104
 Thus the chamber feared that 
Hategekimana could be acquitted for crimes committed under article 6(3) of the 
ICTR Statute since Rwanda did not cover command responsibility as a mode of 
criminal liability. The prosecution appealed but the Appeal‟s Chamber upheld lower 
chamber‟s decision.
105
   
6. Prosecutor v Fulgence Kaishema 
 
Fulgence Kaishema‟s case was also considered for referral to Rwanda.
106
  The 
accused person is still at large and so the chamber sought to know if transferred, 
whether he would be tried in absentia. Thus, the chamber was satisfied that the 
accused will not be tried in absentia as provided by Article 13(7) of the law on 
transfer of cases.
107
 However, other accused persons in Rwanda can be tried in 
absentia as per the Rwandan Criminal Code of procedure.
108
 The exception is 
therefore, for the transferees. According to Kaishema‟s defence, the accused was 
high ranking official therefore not supposed to be transferred to Rwanda as per 
Security Council resolution 1503 and 1534.
109
 Thus, demanded that the Prosecutor 
define criteria for choosing to transfer Kayishema. The Accused is alleged to have 
been the inspector of police of a commune but in the trial chamber‟s reasoning he did 
not qualify for a high ranking official as defined in the ICTR‟s jurisprudence and so 




The chamber however, referring to the ICTR‟s jurisprudence denied the transfer on 
the basis that the accused risked being imprisoned in isolation if convicted by 
                                                          
104
 Ibid at para 18. 
105
 Prosecutor v Ildephonse Hategekimana Decision on Prosecutor‟s Appeal against the Decision on 
Referral of the case of Ildephose Hategekimana to Rwanda under Rule 11 bis’(04/06/ 2008). 
106
 Prosecutor v Fulgence Kayishema Case no. ICTR – 01-67- R11 bis Decision on the Prosecutor‟s Request for 
Referral of case to the Republic of Rwanda (16/12/2008). 
107
 Ibid at para 8. 
108
 See Article 198 of the Law no. 13/2004 of 17/5/2004 Relating to the Code of Criminal Procedure 
Modified and complemented by the Law no. 20/2006 of 22/04/2006( hereinafter Code of Criminal 
Procedure).  
109
  Kayishema (n 106) at bis para  11.  
110













 The chamber also had concerns on witness protection especially 
of the defence just like other chambers before it.
112
 Kaishema‟s Trial Chamber 
however, takes on a contradictory tone when it accepts and states its satisfaction with 
the monitoring bodies- African Commission on Human and People‟s rights in case 
of violation by the government of Rwanda after the referral has been granted;
113
 but 
again indicates its dissatisfaction in regard to witness protection and risk of solitary 
confinement.
114
 This however leaves the researcher wondering about what would in 
fact be satisfactory to enable transfers, if monitoring referred cases cannot be relied 
on. 
7. Prosecutor v Jean Baptiste Gatete 
 
The last case considered for referral to Rwanda is that involving Jean Baptiste 
Gatete.
115
 The trial chamber first clarified its tasks in as far as decisions on referral 
are concerned. It refers to the reasoning of Bagaragaza’s Appeals Chamber and 
states that, a trial chamber designated in accordance with Rule 11 bis, its task is to 
consider whether the state in question has a legal framework which criminalizes the 




Further, the chamber seemed determined not to interfere with national courts‟ 
matters but to do its task as mentioned above while responding to Human Rights 
Watch submissions: Human Rights Watch submitted that Rwanda lacked „potential 
subject matter jurisdiction‟ because the transfer law did not define crimes Gatete was 
accused of and that there is a general lack of clarity on which law would be applied 
if transfer was effected.
117
 The Trial Chamber held that it was not the competent 
authority to decide in any binding way which law applied if the case was referred 
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Contrary to the first clarifications made by this chamber in regard to what its tasks 
are in such a matter, while ruling on whether Rwandan courts would ensure a fair 
trial or not, it departed from that position. The chamber accepted the fact that 
Rwanda had a sufficient legal framework that mirrors article 20 of the ICTR Statute 
on guarantees of rights of accused and fair trial
119
 but argued that the issue presented 
to it, was not only whether the Rwandan law contained the required guarantees but 
other information relevant, such as the practice.
120
 On the other hand, the chamber 
recognised that there was no practice to be considered yet, since prosecutors requests 





In regard to witness protection for the defence, the Trial Chamber did not find 
defence witnesses testifying in transfer proceedings generally at risk given the fact 
that many witnesses had testified in the ICTR and returned home.
122
 The chamber 
correctly added that no judicial system, be it national or international, can guarantee 
absolute protection to witnesses.
123
 In a way, the chamber was departing from other 
chambers‟ positions that seemed to demand absolute protection from Rwanda and 
yet this could not be met in other systems not even at the ICTR. 
 
Concerning witness protection in relation to genocide ideology issues, Gatete‟s Trial 
Chamber was rather not certain in its ruling.  Human Rights Watch and the defence 
argued that some witnesses in Rwanda may not be able to testify for fear of being 
accused of genocide ideology due to an expansive interpretation given to it in 
Rwanda. Despite other facts available to the chamber, such as guarantees in the 
transfer law and the fact that defence witnesses have always testified in Rwanda and 
ICTR, it held that „… [it] cannot exclude that some potential defence witnesses in 
Rwanda may refrain from testifying because of fear of being accused of harbouring 
“genocidal ideology”.'
124
 This implies that no transfers may ever be made since there 
will always be certain witnesses suspected not willing to testify due to such fears and 
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The above ruling on witness protection seems to be contrary to the earlier findings in 
Gatete as indicated above. The chamber had held that, it „did not find defence 
witnesses testifying in transfer proceedings generally at risk given the fact that many 
witnesses had testified in the ICTR and returned home.‟
126
 Secondly, there is no 
evidence showing that witnesses residing in Rwanda refuse to testify in transferred 
proceedings for fear of being accused of genocide ideology, hence it is my 
considered conclusion that this argument is just speculative.  Thirdly, just like the 
ICTR Prosecutor argued in Ildefonse, referrals are governed by the transfer law and 
no cases have so far been transferred to Rwanda
127
 to legitimize such speculation. A 
„greater leeway‟ as suggested by Canter ought to be afforded to Rwanda. 
 
The government of Rwanda responded to Human rights Watch allegations and 
suggested that witnesses outside Rwanda, who may not be willing to come, testify by 
video-link. Gatete‟s Trial Chamber, acknowledged the  use  of video-link as it is 
used in many international and national tribunal including the ICTR but held that it 
would be unprecedented if most witnesses for the defence testified by video-link.
128
 
The argument advanced here is rather less convincing because, being unprecedented 
in itself is not being unfair and besides, it was aimed at solving the problem of 
witnesses unwilling to travel to Rwanda. 
 
 The chamber thus denied referral raising concerns similar to those raised by other 
chambers before and these are: 
 
The Chamber is not satisfied that Gatete will receive a fair trial if 
transferred to Rwanda. First, it is concerned that he will not be able to 
call witnesses residing outside Rwanda to the extent and in a manner 
which will ensure a fair trial. Second, it accepts that the Defence will face 
problems in obtaining witnesses residing in Rwanda because they will be 
afraid to testify. Third, there is a risk that Gatete, if convicted to life 
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V.  Analysis and conclusion 
 
The ICTR judges seem not to be clear on the criteria and what their role in 
proceedings for referral is. The issue is whether they should decide on national 
jurisdictions‟ capacity to ensure a fair trial or not. In Hategekimana, the Trial 
Chamber opined that a chamber designated under rule 11 bis is authorised to judge 
on such matters while responding to the prosecutor‟s argument. The Prosecutor 
argued that the chamber‟s task is to determine whether there are laws applicable to 
the proceedings against the accused [Hategekimana] in Rwanda that would ensure a 
fair trial or not.
130
 The chamber disagreed and stated that; „the chamber 
acknowledges that it is not required to look beyond the relevant legislation, but 
considers that it is authorized to do so, as sub- Rule 11 bis states that, the chamber‟s 





What is apparent though is the fact that ICTR judges have no consensus on which 
tasks a chamber designated under Rule 11 bis is required to perform. The Appeals 
Chamber in Bagaragaza and the Trial Chamber in Gatete indicated that: the 
chamber‟s task is „to consider whether the state in question has a legal framework 
which criminalizes the alleged conduct of the accused, and if it provides an adequate 
penalty structure.‟
132
 As discussed earlier, most judges did not consider this as the 
only task, not even Gatete‟s Trial Chamber which had set out to define its tasks. 
 
Apparently, ICTR judges seem to apply double standards when deciding on referrals, 
a view also shared by Canter.  Rwanda is required to do a lot more than what is 
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required of other countries that were considered for referral.
133
  For instance, the 
Trial Chamber in the referral of Bagaraza to the Netherlands had indicated its 
satisfaction according to Rule 11 bis requirements despite the contrary as was 
indicated later as to revoke the referral.
134
 Similarly, the chambers that referred two 
accused (Munyeshyaka and Bucyibaruta) to France were easily satisfied that they 
would be tried in accordance with Rule 11 bis requirements.
135
 What France did in 
Bucyibaruta and Munyeshyaka‟s trial, was only to indicate legal guarantees existing 
in French laws.
136
  This is however different for Rwanda as judges in Prosecutor v 
Hategekimana and other chambers argued that they had to go beyond legal 




In addition, the issue of witness protection in these two cases guaranteed by France 
did not go beyond anonymous testifying and closed session at trial but the chamber 
was satisfied that they would be protected.
138
 This is however different for Rwanda, 
as it is required to fulfil a whole lot more, as discussed above. 
 
Furthermore, the chambers that authorized transfers to France, did not take note of 
the fact that France has a single judge system (in the tribunale de police)
139
 nor did 
Human Rights Watch or defence raise any concerns to that effect. However, a single 
judge system, as discussed earlier and pointed out by the Munyakazi Trial Chamber 
was a bar to the referral because it could not ensure a fair trial.
140
 Here again, ICTR 
judges have no consensus on what constitutes a fair trial in case of referral. In one 
chamber a single judge system affects the independence of the court and so infringes 
the right to affair trial, in another it does not.  
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Again, various ICTR chambers on referral  despite prosecutor‟s  and Rwanda‟s 
submissions and assurances in the law on transfer that various bodies would be 
allowed to monitor transfer proceedings, indicated their dissatisfaction that the 
accused if transferred to Rwanda would have fair trial and would not be imprisoned 
in isolation. On the other hand, France did show that there are no legal provisions to 
allow monitoring of proceedings in accordance to Rule 11 bis D (V), but simply 
promised in its briefs that it would be possible if the request is made through the 
Procureur de la Républic.
141
 The two transferees (Munyeshyaka and Bucyibaruta 
were later released on bail and reasons for this is not clear to the Rwandan people.
142
 
Although there is no such legal interest or duty on the country of destination 
(country which receives cases from ICTR) to justify decisions of its courts on 
transferred cases, for purposes of fostering reconciliation, such proceedings should 
be made known to the victim state. 
 
In this chapter, I have argued that that the ICTR should, in Canter‟s words, give 
Rwanda „greater leeway‟ by facilitating the transfer of cases in view of strides that 
Rwanda has taken. This will also go a long way towards enabling the ICTR achieve 
its goals. As Drumbl posits: „When justice is externalised from the afflicted societies 
which it is intended, it then becomes more difficult for any of the proclaimed goals 
of prosecution and punishing human rights abusers – whether denouncing radical 
evil, expressing rule of law, voicing retribution or preventing recidivism – take 
hold.‟
143
 The ICTR‟s version of justice in many respects is externalised justice and 
so, for it to gain legitimacy among those it is meant for, it should allow more cases to 
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The claim to equality before the law is considered as most fundamental of all rights 
available to man, and a starting point of all other liberties.
144
 In international law, the 
principle of equality is stated in the negative form, as of non – discrimination.
145
 
This chapter analyses this important principle of equality and non – discrimination 
under international, regional and Rwandan law. It also defines concept of equality 
and discrimination in the legal terms. It further analyses states‟ negative and positive 
obligations to ensure this right. It also analyses circumstances under which a state 
may be justified to treat people differently in similar situations/cases. 
II. Defining and identifying the principle of Equality 
 
It is widely accepted that equality and non-discrimination are positive and negative 
statements of the same principle.
146
 Equality implies an absence of discrimination 
while non-discrimination implies the attainment of equality.
147
 Furthermore, equality 
before the law demands that every person is entitled to equal protection and 
treatment before the law and its processes.
148
 Importantly, the principle of equality 
before the law in sentencing requires that sentencing decisions treat offenders 





Warwick asserts that  a „belief in equality‟, is a deep-rooted principle in human 
thought and that one man should not be preferred to another unless there is a reason 
recognized as sufficient by some identifiable criterion.
150
 In sentencing, Ashworth 
adds  that the principle of equality hardly needs any justification, „for it is surely 
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unjust that people should be penalised at the sentencing stage for any of these 
reasons‟
151
 such as wealth, race, colour, sex, employment or family status.  
 
The principle has been identified in various literature and law to form a basis of most 
legal principles. Warwick quoting judge Manley Hudson points out that equity is a 
principle of law and that „equality is equity.‟
152
  Further, it is argued that the 
principles of equality are general principles of law – which are regarded as „juridical 




Warwick further argues that those principles underlying punishment and suppression 
of certain crimes such as genocide and slavery are recognized by civilized nations as 
binding on states without any conventional obligation – jus cogens.
154
 He thus 
asserts that slavery and genocide are the extreme examples of the denial of the right 
to equality and that if such practices are considered to be contrary to jus cogens, then 
it is reasonable to consider other examples of denial to be contrary to the doctrine.
155
 
The United Nations Charter under article 1(3) obligates states to ensure human rights 
equally thus to establish and enforce any distinction would be a flagrant violation of 
the charter. Equality takes on two conceptual frameworks both under international 
and national law: Formal and substantive equality. 
 
III. Formal equality 
 
Formal equality implies that individuals in like situations should be treated alike.
156
  
Formal equality is said to be characterized by a „symmetrical equal treatment of what 
is considered equal in the definition of prevailing groups.‟
157
 It focuses on equal 
treatment based on the appearance of similarity regardless of the broader context. 
Thus, laws or practices which give different treatment to individuals in similar 
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situations may result in direct discrimination.
158
 Formal equality has however been 
criticized for being indeterminate in that it requires consistency of treatment but 
makes no demand on the content, that it does not explain who are equal and those 
who are unequal for purposes of its application, that it uses a comparator (i.e. that 
one should claim a violation if there is another person in similar situation who is 
treated better or differently from the one alleging mistreatment but this may be hard 
to prove in cases where there is discrimination but with no exact comparative 
group/situation), and that it is uncritical of structural disadvantages meaning that 
they may be maintained under formal equality.
159
  
IV. Substantive equality 
 
Substantive equality entails treating individuals in different situations, differently 
and those in similar situations, similarly.
160
 In other words, substantive equality 
focuses more on „asymmetrical‟ application of equality and non – discrimination law 
where attention is paid to the context in which discrimination takes place especially 
the history of the socially disadvantaged groups.
161
 Substantive equality is lauded for 
achieving equality of results, correcting past discrimination, allowing positive 
measures, and for taking into account diversity.
162
 The general view on the principle 
of non-discrimination is hence that, it does not require absolute equality or identity 
of treatment but its relative application.
163





In 1949, the United Nations General Secretary – Trygve Lie  defined the term 
discrimination as any „conduct based on distinction made on grounds of natural or 
social categories which have no relation either to individual capacities or merits or to 
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concrete behaviour of the individual person.
164
 The term connotes a negative 
treatment of an individual in comparison with others, in a similar situation. This 
view is said to have been depicted when a proposal to the Human Rights 
Commission to add the word „arbitrary‟ to „discrimination‟ was rejected on the 
ground that the term already meant „invidious distinction‟ and that had a „derogatory 
meaning of unfair, unequal treatment.‟
165
 The Human Rights Committee (HRC) – a 
body that oversees state party compliance with the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights (ICCPR), interpreted the prohibition of „discrimination‟ under 
Article 2 and Article 26 of the ICCPR to include both direct and indirect 
discrimination, and stated that: 
 
The Committee believes that the terms „discrimination‟ as used in the 
Covenant should be understood to imply any distinction, exclusion, 
restriction or preference which is based on any ground such as race, 
colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or 
social origin, property, birth or other status, and which has the purpose or 
effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise 




Thus, discrimination is clearly negative and a violation of the fundamental rights of 
man which should not be mistaken to be just differentiation as indicated above. 
VI. Direct and indirect discrimination 
 
Direct discrimination is said to be based on the idea of formal equality and is defined 
as „less favourable or detrimental treatment of an individual or group of individuals 
on the basis of a prohibited characteristic or grounds such as race, sex, or 
disability.‟
167
 Indirect discrimination on the other hand is said to occur, when a law, 
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States may under both international law and national law, make certain distinctions 
with regard to the enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms without 
violating the right to equality. The general stipulations in Article 4 of International 
Covenant on Economic, social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) give guidance on 
when the right to non-discrimination may be limited; it states that „…the state may 
subject such rights only to such limitations as are determined by law only in so far as 
this may be compatible with the nature of these rights and solely for the purpose of 




There are instances where a differential treatment cannot be claimed but preferential 
treatment in analogous similar situation. The ECtHR in the case of Building Societies 
v the United Kingdom
170
 declared that preferential treatment was unjustified. The 
complainant argued that a particular legislation prevented Building Societies from 
claiming reimbursement of taxes, but did not apply to another building company - 
Woolwich Building Society.
171
 The problem was that the general stipulations of the 
legislation did not reach Woolwich, and that the successive piece of legislation 
expressly exempted Woolwich.  Preferential treatment was established as payments 
had been made to Woolwich.
172
 Thus, like the ECtHR held in Building Societies, it 
is the position of this thesis that discrimination or preferential treatment should not 
be dismissed on the ground that the LTC does not explicitly state in its provisions 
that certain guarantees enjoyed by the transferees are not to be extended to the 
locally accused persons. Where certain treatment is extended to transferees and not 
transferees, a contest against preferential treatment is hence justified. 
VII. Equality under international law 
 
Non-discrimination, together with equality before the law and equal protection of the 
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Non-discrimination and equality clauses in the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (UNDHR) clearly state that, human rights apply to all people without 
distinction of any kind.
174
 Note that principles (including the principle of equality) in 
the UNDHR by a widespread and constant recognition by the majority of states have 
crystallised into international customary law.
175
  Evidence of this is the fact that 
UNDHR has become part of most constitutions of the world (state practice or opinio 
juris). Hence Rwanda has an international legal obligation to ensure the right to 
equality accruing from international customary law as it has not persistently objected 
to it
176
 so as to relieve itself of this obligation but rather, Rwanda has recognised the 
right to equality in its various laws as will be discussed later on.  
 
The United Nations Charter also proclaim the principle of equality and calls upon 
state parties to create conditions under which justice and international obligations 





The ICCPR amply expound on the principle of equality.
178
 Particular attention is 
paid to article 14 and 26 of the ICCPR due to its relevancy to the subject under 
consideration in this thesis. The former speaks of equality of all before courts and 
tribunals while the later, prohibits discrimination with regard to all rights and 
guarantees recognized by the law. The HRC in Broeks v the Netherlands
179
 held that 
if a state passes legislation in its sovereign power, it should be consistent with article 
26. The HRC also clarified the scope of discrimination covered by the ICCPR in 
reference to article 26, it stated that, „open ended‟ by the phrase; „or other status‟ and 
interpreted it to mean that discrimination was prohibited on additional grounds to 
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The ICESCR also protects the right to equality in its various provisions.
181
 The 
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination 
(ICERD) specifically protects and promotes the right to equality.
182
 Its 
implementation is monitored by Committee on Elimination of all forms of Racial 
Discrimination (CERD). The protection of ICERD is limited to the specified grounds 
of „race, colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin.‟
183
 However, article 5 of 
ICERD provides for equality of all before the law and thus seems to give general 
protection against all forms of discrimination. 
 
The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women 
(CEDAW) is another treaty that protects against discrimination.
184
 Its 
implementation and compliance by state parties is monitored by the Committee on 
the Elimination of All forms of Discrimination against Women- CEDAW. Protection 
against discrimination in CEDAW is limited to „discrimination against women.‟ 
Article 1(1) refers only to one ground of discrimination, sex discrimination. 
 
The Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC)
185
 also protects against 
discrimination in regard to children. The Committee on the Rights of the Child is the 
monitoring body. Protection against discrimination under the CRC is also limited to 
children. However, the “other status” language in Article 2(1), reflecting identical 
language in the ICCPR and the ICESCR, indicates that the CRC is open-ended as to 
the grounds of discrimination covered. 
 
The right to equality is well protected under international law and there is a duty to 
protect this right by states which are party to the human rights instruments discussed 
above. As discussed below, Rwanda is a party to all these instruments and hence has 
the duty to uphold them. 
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VIII. Regional systems on human right and the principle of equality 
 
At regional level, the European Convention on the Protection of Human Rights 
(ECHR), the American Convention on Human rights (AmCHR) and African Charter 
on Human and People‟s Rights (ACHPR) are discussed in relation to the right to 
equality and non – discrimination. 
 
1. European Convention on the Protection of human Rights (ECHR) 
 
The ECHR was created by the Council of Europe and almost every State in Europe 
is a full member of the Council and a party to the ECHR.
186
 The European Court of 
Human Rights (ECtHR) is the body charged with enforcing the rights and freedoms 
protected under the ECHR. Articles1 and 14 of ECHR specifically cover the right to 
equality. The equality of rights provided by these provisions concerns only rights 
provided in the convention. According to ECtHR jurisprudence, discrimination 
under Article 14 occurs when there is different treatment of persons in „analogous or 
relevantly similar situations and if that difference in treatment has no objective and 
reasonable justification‟.
187
 „Objective and reasonable justification‟ is said to be 
established when the treatment in question has a legitimate aim and where there is a 
reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means employed and the aim 




2. African Charter on Human and People’s Rights (ACHPR) 
 
The African Charter on Human and People‟s Rights was adopted by the Organisation 
of African Unity (OAU) in 1981 and entered into force in 1986.
189
 The African 
Commission on Human and Peoples‟ Rights (African Commission)
190
 and more 
recently, the African Court on Human and People‟s Rights (ACtHPR) are the bodies 
that oversee state compliance with the charter. The African Commission has the 
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power to investigate and consider „communications‟ from States and individuals 
regarding violations of the Charter.
191
 However, its recommendations are not binding 
and its proceedings take place in private.  
 
Articles specifically protecting equality in the ACHPR include: article 2, 3, 13 and 
19. Article 2 ensures equality only in regard to the rights provided in the charter 
whereas article 3 extends protection to all rights provided by the law. Unlike other 
international and regional instruments that focus only on the individual protection 
against discrimination, Article 19 of the ACHPR expressly prohibits domination or 
discrimination of one group of people by another group. This group rights focus 
extends to Article 22, which promotes the right of a people to economic, social and 
cultural development. 
 
The African Commission in the case of Legal Resources Foundation v Zambia
192
  
emphasised the right to equality by stating that: „The right to equality is very 
important. It means that citizens should expect to be treated fairly and justly within 
the legal system and be assured of equal treatment before the law and equal 
enjoyment of the rights available to all other citizens.‟ 
 
3. The American Convention on Human Rights (AmCHR) 
 
The American Convention on Human Rights (AmCHR) was adopted by the 
Organization of American States (OAS) in 1969 and entered into force on 18 July 
1978.
193
 The OAS had created the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 
(IACHR) to promote and protect human rights in the region. Since 1965, the IACHR 
has been expressly authorised to examine individual complaints or petitions 
regarding human rights violations under the American Declaration. The adoption of 
the AmCHR in 1969 granted additional powers to the IACHR to consider individual 
complaints under that instrument.  
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The AmCHR also created the Inter-American Court of Human Rights ( IACtHR) as 
a supplementary enforcement organ for the AmCHR. Articles in AmCHR 
specifically protecting the right to equality include; articles 1, 3, 24, and 26. Article 
27 of the AmCHR, like Article 4 of the ICCPR, provides that derogations by a State 
in time of war, public danger, or other emergency that threatens its independence or 
security must not discriminate on the grounds of race, colour, sex, language, religion, 
or social origin. 
 
Rwanda is only a party to the ACHPR and so has the obligation to protect and 
promote rights in the charter. Although Rwanda is not a state party to the American 
and European systems of human rights, lessons can be drawn from them. 
 
IX. Equality under Rwandan law 
 
Rwanda is a state party to most international human rights treaties and is thus 
obliged to respect and promote rights in these instruments.
194
  Having inherited a 
civil law tradition, international treaties duly ratified by Rwanda automatically 
become part of its municipal law without any other act of parliament domesticating 
them .i.e. monism. It is important to note here that treaties duly ratified by Rwanda; 
rank number two after the Constitution in importance.
195
 Thus any act or law of the 
state that is contrary to these treaties is a violation of both national and international 
state legal obligations. In this section however, I will discuss some of the Rwandan 
laws (exclusively domestic) that supplement international provisions in protection of 
the right to equality. 
 
The Rwandan Constitution, just like in many other countries, is the supreme law in 
the country.
196
 Importantly, it protects the right to equality in its various provisions. 
The Rwandan constitution in its article 9, considers the right to equality as one of the 
fundamental principles. This reaffirms Warwick‟s assertions mentioned earlier, that 
the right to equality is a general principle of law. Article 11(1) of the Constitution 
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goes further than stating that the right to equality is just a fundamental principle of 
law; to stating that it is a right which everyone is entitled to, and forbids 
discrimination of any kind in the enjoyment of all rights protected by the 
Constitution.
197
 This provision may be construed to be limiting the right of equality 
to only rights stipulated in the Constitution.  
 
However, Article 16 and 45(2) of the Rwanda Constitution extends the protection. 
The former provides for the right to „equality for all before the law‟ while the later 
states that everyone should have equal access to public services. Meaning that, 
all/any guarantees provided by the Rwandan laws or institutions or policies should 
be available to all without any distinction.  
 
The Rwandan Constitution just like the African Charter does not only guarantee 
rights but also spells out duties for the citizens. Article 47 of the Constitution gives 
citizens a duty to safe guard equality and article 46 before it, gives a corresponding 
right, to relate to others without discrimination. Putting a seal to the above and 
several other provisions in the Constitution, Art 48 stipulates that „in all 
circumstances everyone has the duty to respect the Constitution.‟ Thus, the right to 
equality is a constitutional right which should be respected at all times. Other laws 
are bound to be consistent with the provisions of the Constitution
198
 and in case of 
violation of a Constitutional right by any organic laws, laws, decree- laws, 




In criminal proceedings, the right to equality of all the parties involved in a case is 
guaranteed by Article 1 (2) of the Rwandan Code of Criminal Procedure.
200
 The right 
to equality is therefore protected under Rwandan law, regional and international law 
and so the state has no justification to defy this right. 
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X. State obligation in relation to the right to equality 
 
States have the obligation under international law to protect and promote human 
rights.
201
 These obligations are dispensed in two forms: positive and negative 
obligation. The negative obligation of the state in relation to equality entails the state 
refraining from discriminating which may take a form of national legislation.
202
 The 
HRC while commenting on the state responsibility in regard to the right to equality 
stated that, the state has the duty under the ICCPR to respect and ensure individuals‟ 
rights without distinction of any kind.
203
 The state is the primary responsible organ 
in case of violations and the Committee on CERD allows individuals to bring claims 
against public authorities that fail to enforce equality provisions in both private and 
public realms. 
  
The obligation of the state in relation to the protection of human rights has been 
clarified as not only of complying with non-discrimination principles itself, but also 
to ensure that those principles are implemented within the State between private 
actors.
204
 These measures have come to be referred to as „positive obligations‟ of the 
state which include „obligations to implement, to ensure or guarantee rights as well 
as respecting them.‟
205
 However, such obligations are not explicitly set out in 
international instruments on human rights but have been developed through case law. 
The HRC in the General Comment 18 pointed out that; positive obligations of the 
state under equality provisions entails use of special measures for certain groups of 




From the above discussion, it is established that the right to equality and non-
discrimination are protected both under international and Rwandan law, and that 
there is a positive and negative duty on Rwanda as a state to respect and ensure this 
right. 
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XI. Justification of differential treatment 
 
This section discusses grounds justifying differential treatment both under 
international law, and Rwandan law. 
1.  Under international law 
 
Ian Brownlie rightly points out that there is a growing body of legal materials on 
which discrimination may be distinguished from reasonable measures of 
differentiation.
207
 He adds that the principle of equality before the law allows for 
factual differences such as sex, or age and that it is not based on mechanical 
conception of equality.
208
 Thus, this section spells out such measures. 
 
a.  Objective, reasonable and legitimate justification 
 
The HRC in General Comment 18 stated that not every differentiation of treatment is 
tantamount to discrimination. It held that differentiation is justified if the criteria for 
such differentiation are reasonable and objective and if the aim is to achieve a 
purpose which is legitimate.
209
  The HRC added that, it assesses the aim and effects 
of the measures or omissions in order to determine whether they are legitimate and 
compatible with the nature of the Covenant rights and are solely for the purpose of 
promoting the general welfare in a democratic society. Further, that there must be a 
clear and reasonable relationship of proportionality between the aim sought to be 
realised and the measures or omissions and their effects.  
 
Furthermore, CERD has observed that a differentiation of treatment will not 
constitute discrimination if the criteria for such differentiation, judged against the 
objectives and purposes of the Convention, are legitimate or fall within the scope of 
article 1, paragraph 4, of the Convention.
210
 In considering the criteria that may have 
been employed, the Committee stated that it acknowledges particular actions that 
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may have varied purposes and when seeking to determine whether an action has an 
effect contrary to the Convention, it analyses whether that action has an unjustifiable 
disparate impact upon a group distinguished by race, colour, descent, or national or 




 For purposes of understanding  „objective and reasonable and legitimate 
justification, a classical case earlier cited in the ECtHR context, gives a glimpse of 
what they are: in the Belgian Linguistics
212
 case, the respondent state - Belgian 
advanced the argument that „positive discrimination in favour of the Flemish 
language was in the public interest and pursued a legitimate aim, that of the 
protection of the linguistic homogeneity of certain regions in order to prevent the 
„phenomenon of francisation‟ in Dutch speaking areas in Flanders.‟ The court to a 
certain extent concurred with the respondent, it held that measures which would 
ensure that, „in a unilingual region, the teaching language of official or subsidised 
schools be only that of the region are not arbitrary and therefore not discriminatory. 
However, the court deferred by stating that the measure preventing certain children, 
solely on the basis of their parents‟ residence, from having access to French-
language schools in the communes of „special status‟, was.‟
213
   
 
Just like the HRC held above, the ECtHR further clarified the procedure of 
establishing such measures: 
The existence of such [an objective and reasonable] justification must be 
assessed in relation to the aim and effects of the measure under 
consideration, regard being had to the principles which normally prevail 
in democratic societies. A difference of treatment in the exercise of a 
right laid down in the Convention must not only pursue a legitimate aim: 
Article 14… is likewise violated when it is clearly established that there 
is no reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means 
employed and the aim sought to be realised. 
 
 It has not been considered enough for a responding state to prove that the 
differentiation sought a legitimate end but it has also been required to show 
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proportionality of the means employed and the extent to which private interests have 
been sacrificed for public interest.
214
 There is a need to maintain a balance between 




b.  Lack of resources 
 
Some respondent states have used a defence of lack of resources for failure to 
remove differential treatment. The ICESCR recognizes that due to limited resource, 
states may not be able to ensure certain rights and so allows states to progressively 
realize them.
216
 However, the CESCR has stated that, lack of resources is not an 
objective and reasonable justification unless every effort has been made to use all 
resources that are at the State party‟s disposition in an effort to address and eliminate 




c.  Safety 
 
Differential treatment aimed at achieving physical safety of individuals or groups is 
another ground considered justifying differential treatment.  In the case of Bhinder 
Singh v Canada,
218
  the HRC found no violation of the right to equality due to the 
fact that measures the applicant was advancing were aimed at his safety.  The facts 
of the case were that Mr Bhinder Singh, was a naturalized Canadian citizen born in 
India, a Sikh by religion and so he wore a turban on his head.
219
 In 1974, he was 
employed by the Canadian Railway Corporation which required him like other 
employees to wear a hard hat to protect him against injuries and electric shock 
during work. Mr. Bhinder however refused to wear the hat as it was against his 
religion and so claimed discrimination on the basis of religion. After exhaustion of 
local remedies he sought redress from the Human Rights Committee. 
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The HRC held that the legislation which required workers to wear hard hurts on the 
face of it seemed neutral but was discriminatory indirectly given the fact that it was 
against the people of Sikh religion, as the author claims violation under Articles 18 
and 26 of the ICCPR.
220
 However, the committee held that requiring employees to 
wear hard hats was aimed at protecting them from injury and electric shocks even if 
it is against the Sikh religion and so it is reasonable and directed towards objective 
purposes compatible with covenant.
221
 
d.  Principle of Subsidiarity 
 
The principle of subsidiarity is well developed in the European system of human 
rights. It has also been invoked as a ground justifying differential treatment. In the 
Beligian linguistics case, in order to determine whether the differentiation was 
legitimate or not, the court invoked the principle of „subsidiarity.‟
222
 The principle is 
explained as „the freedom retained by natural authorities – states, to choose measures 
considered appropriate in matters covered by the ECHR.‟
223
 The government of 
South Africa in Garreth Anver Prince case,
224
 referred to the principle of 
subsidiarity as a natural delimitation of functions between national authorities of 
state parties to the African Charter and the Charter itself.  Making submissions to the 
African Commission on Human and Peoples‟ Rights, the government of South 
Africa argued that: 
 
The national authorities should have the initial responsibility to guarantee 
rights and freedoms within the domestic legal orders of the respective 
states, and in discharging this duty, should be able to decide on 
appropriate means of implementation. To this end, the African 
Commission should construct its role as subsidiary, as narrower and 
supervisory competence in subsequently reviewing a State‟s choice in 
light of the standards set by the provisions of the Charter. In terms of this 
construction, the African Commission should not substitute domestic 
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The principle of subsidiarity may be claimed by state parties to international 
conventions in regard to the rights covered by such conventions, however, there is a 
limit to this principle when the „objective and reasonable‟ and proportionality test is 
applied. The subsidiary test can however be easily satisfied when a‟ legitimate aim‟ 
test is applied. 
e. Principle of Margin of appreciation 
 
Another guiding principle that has existed in the European system of human rights is 
that of „margin of appreciation.‟ The practice of recognizing and respecting states' 
margin of appreciation was derived from the case-law of the Court and European 
Commission of Human Rights (ECHR), not from the text of the Convention itself.
226
 
Its relevance can be raised by the Court on its own initiative, or by the contracting 
parties themselves, by way of a defence to the allegation that they have violated a 
Convention right.
227
 The principle generally refers to the amount of discretion an 





In Rasmussen v Denmark,
229
 the ECtHR held that, states enjoy a certain „margin of 
appreciation‟ in assessing whether and to what extent differences in otherwise 
similar situations justify a different treatment in law. The HRC in the case of 
Aumeeruddy-Cziffra and 19 other Mauritian Women v Mauritius
230
 where a 
discriminatory measure against married women was at issue, the Committee implied 
the national margin of appreciation in assessing the scope of protection afforded to 
family life when it stated that: „The committee is of the opinion that the legal 
protection or measures a society or a state can afford to the family may vary from 
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country to country and depend on different social, economic, political and cultural 
conditions and traditions‟.
231
    
 
The state parties enjoy a certain but not unlimited margin of appreciation in the 
matter of imposition of restrictions but the court (ECHR) gives final ruling on 
whether they are compatible with the convention.
232
 The principle is not explicit in 
the African system of human rights but it is only hoped that the „claw back clauses‟ 




f. Affirmative action 
 
Affirmative/positive action is permitted by almost all international human rights 
instruments as legitimate differential treatment.
234
  The CESCR stated that in order 
to eliminate substantive discrimination, States parties may be, and in some cases are, 
under an obligation to adopt special measures to attenuate or suppress conditions that 
perpetuate discrimination.
235
 It added that such measures are legitimate to the extent 
that they represent reasonable, objective and proportional means to redress de facto 
discrimination and are discontinued when substantive equality has been sustainably 
achieved. The committee further held that positive measures may exceptionally, be 
of a permanent nature, such as in the interpretation services for linguistic minorities 
and reasonable accommodation of persons with sensory impairments in accessing 
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2. Under Rwandan law 
 
Rwandan law as discussed above, protect and promote the right to equality, however, 
it does allow differential treatment under specified circumstances.  
 
a. Affirmative action 
 
Firstly, the Rwandan Constitution provides for affirmative or positive action to 
ensure substantive equality for certain people. For instance, the Constitution 
provides that special measures should be taken for children
237
 and for disabled 
children in education.
238
 Thus differentiation in treatment is justified in respect of 
affirmative action. 
 
In criminal matters, the Rwandan sentencing laws give guidelines on when persons 
accused of committing similar crimes may be justifiably sentenced differently as 
discussed below. 
b. Mitigating circumstances 
 
The Rwandan Criminal Code provides that certain circumstances may aggravate, or 
mitigate or be excused for certain criminal acts.
239
 Thus, people who may commit 
similar crimes under similar circumstances may receive different penalties without 
violating the right to equal treatment. 
 
The age of the offender is considered at the sentencing stage. Where it is established 
that the offender in question was a minor, at the time he/she committed a crime, 
his/her sentence may be reduced.
240
 This is because when establishing criminal 
liability, a minor‟s real criminal intent to commit a crime is said not be fully 
established so as to apply the full rigour of criminal law on him/her. 
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The Rwandan Criminal Code also considers provocation as a ground for 
mitigation
241
  and in certain instances; provocation may be accepted as an excuse. 
This is premised on the „culpability principle‟ of sentencing which is that one should 
not penalize offenders for unforeseen results.
242
 The level of culpability differs and 
so is the response in terms of punishment for certain conduct. This is usually applied 
in the retributive model of sentencing where punishment is determined by the level 




The Rwandan criminal code however, does not give a closed list of what mitigating 
circumstance may include but leaves discretion to the sentencing judge to appreciate 




The Rwandan Code of Criminal Procedure adds another ground for mitigation; - a 
person who „unequivocally admits‟ to have committed a crime, his/her sentence may 
be reduced to a half.
245
  In regard to genocide cases, most of which are decided by 
Gacaca Courts, mitigating circumstances include: the accused confessing, pleading 
guilty and asking for forgiveness before investigation, after investigation or during 
trial. For an offender who does that, his/her punishment is reduced or commuted 
depending on the stage (before investigations commenced, during or after they have 
commence) at which he/she accepted and confessed – the earlier the confession is 
made, the lesser the sentence.
246
  Also, the Gacaca Courts consider age as one of the 
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c. Aggravating circumstances 
 
The Rwandan penal code also provides for aggravating circumstances and these 
include: premeditation, recidivism and concomitance of crimes.
 248
 Gacaca law also 
considers recidivism, combination of crimes – where a person committed several 





XII.  Conclusion 
 
Indeed, the right to equality before the law is the most fundamental of the rights of 
man, and the basis of all other liberties.
250
 It is undisputable therefore that states are 
under both positive and negative obligation to ensure the right to equality. It has 
been established that, the claim should be to attain substantive rather mechanical 
equality. This chapter has differentiated between acts of differentiation that are 
justified from acts of discrimination by states. Distinction in treatment of individuals 
can be legitimate if it is reasonable and not arbitrary and has objective justification 
and where there is a reasonable relationship of proportionality between the aim 
sought and the means employed.
251
  The Rwandan sentencing laws have demarcated 
areas from which differentiation between the accused persons may be permitted. The 
next chapter analyses provisions of LTC in relation to the principle of equality and 
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CHAPTER 4: ASSESSING THE LTC IN RELATION TO THE RIGHT TO 
EQUALITY 
I.  Introduction 
 
This chapter analyses the kind of treatment, LTC accords transferees in comparison 
with other locally accused persons. Thus, it asses temporal jurisdiction of the ICTR 
visa avis that of Rwanda, competency of court, composition of the bench, 
indictment, evidence collection, right to counsel, witness protection, sentences and 
conditions of detention.  
1. Conflict of temporal jurisdiction  
 
Before the establishment of the ICTR, Rwanda had objected to the restricted 
temporal jurisdiction of the ICTR.
252
 Rwanda showed that the genocide was 
premeditated hence pilot projects for extermination were successfully conducted.
253
  
The Security Council, however, limited the ICTR‟s mandate to crimes committed 
between 1
st




  whereas Rwanda maintained its 
position and so prosecutes genocide and other related crimes committed between, 1
st
 




 The law on transfer of cases provides that 
„a person whose case is transferred from the ICTR to Rwanda shall be prosecuted 




This implies that persons, who committed similar crimes, will be prosecuted 
differently based on this law. The transferees will be prosecuted for only a few 
crimes due to this limited time while other locally accused persons face more 
charges. For instance, Gatete Jean-Baptiste one of those appearing in the ICTR, is 
alleged to have been involved in most crimes committed between 1990 and 1993 in 
the Eastern province of Rwanda, but now stands accused only of crimes committed 
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 Gatete and several others indicted by 
the ICTR held positions of power in the period of 1993 and 1994 and so, some 
crimes may have been committed under their command but under the LTC, those 
they commanded will be prosecuted for crimes committed between 1993 to 1994 but 
they(transferees) will not, themselves. Applying the test of „reasonable and 
objective‟ justification for differentiation discussed in the previous chapter; to this 
form of differentiation among the accused, it neither passes as „reasonable‟ nor as 
„objective‟ but rather as unfair. It does not also pass as a mitigating or excuse ground 
under Rwandan sentencing laws discussed in chapter three. This is because, the 
moral culpability of the transferees for crimes of genocide surpasses that of the 




2. Competent court 
 
An accused person has a right to be tried by an impartial and competent court.
259
  
Thus the High Court of the Republic of Rwanda is the court to hear cases concerning 
transferees on the first instance and appeals in the Supreme Court.
260
 People being 
prosecuted in local courts falling in category one discussed earlier
261
 save those tried 
by Gacaca Courts, are tried by the Intermediate Courts on the first instance.
262
 
Contentions here may be that the High Court and Supreme Court are the highest 
courts in Rwanda and so, judges in these two courts are more senior to other judges 
in the lower courts.
263
 This means that transferees are likely to have more 
professional hearings than those appearing before lower courts. The logical counter 
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argument however could be that appearing before an experienced judge does not 
necessarily guarantee a fair trial.  
 
Again, although concerns about equality may be raised due to the fact that 
persons(transferees and other locally accused) accused of similar crimes may appear 
before different courts according to the LTC,  tribute must be paid to the idea of 
substantive equality and the defence of „legitimate aim‟ discussed in chapter three. 
This is because, it is not so necessary that the accused be heard by the same court as 
may be demanded under formal equality but rather, the concern should be whether 
they all receive a fair trial in the respective courts they appear before.  
 
Again, the LTC can be justified when the „legitimate test‟ is used because the 
government of Rwanda pursues a legitimate aim - having the transfers effected. The 
ICTR that originally handles the transferees, uses procedures recognised as of an 
international nature. At national level, the High Court and the Supreme Court are 
better placed to hear these cases than the lower courts, because the former have more 
experienced judges as indicated above. In addition, due to the importance given to 
the transfer and advantages expected from them, it is justified in this case for the 
LTC to agree to differentiate the transferees from the locally accused, in regard to 
the courts each would appear before. 
3.  Composition of the bench 
 
 In Prosecutor v Munyakazi,
264
 the Trial Chamber denied request for transfer of the 
accused to Rwanda because the system there, allows a single judge to preside over a 
matter. The Trial Chamber held that the system of a single judge threatened the 
independence of the judiciary arguing that a single judge may submit to external 
pressures and hence be impartial. It suggested a bench of three at trial and five on 
appeal.
265
 Following this judgment, Rwanda amended the law on transfer of cases to 
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indicate that transferees may be tried by a bench of three or more judges.
266
 This 




However, in light of the Appeals Chamber‟s ruling in Munyakazi‟ having a number 
of judges presiding at a hearing does not guarantee that a trial will be fair. Arguably 
though, supposing that such fears are founded, it follows that the other accused 
(locally accused) will appear before a single judge and yet crimes are the same as 
those of transferees. This violates the rule of equality before the law as; one is 
exposed to the risk while the other is protected. 
 
4.  Mode of indictment 
 
The law on transfer provides that the Prosecutor General of the Republic of Rwanda 
may adapt indictments to make them compliant with the Rwandan Code of Criminal 
Procedure.
268
 This is supported by Hategekimana Trial Chamber
269
 which held that, 
adapting the indictment to national laws is necessary to effectuate transfer and cites 
jurisprudence of the ICTR and ICTY. This provision if followed, would have solved 
the issues contended in this research but it turns out to be a false promise. It 
contradicts other provisions of the law on transfer because of variations in terms of 
penalty, temporal and subject matter jurisdiction as discussed in this chapter. The 
issue is therefore not of discrimination but legal contradiction or inconsistency of 
article 4 of the law on transfer of cases with other provisions of the same law as was 
raised in Prosecutor v Ildephonse Hategekimana.
270
  
5. Evidence collection 
 
Article 7(1) of the law on transfer of cases provides that evidence collected in 
accordance with the ICTR Statute and Rules of Procedure will be used in the High 
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 The ICTR is modelled on international law which in some respects 
different from that of Rwanda. For instance, the ICTR Rules of Procedure explicitly 
provide that the accused/defence can; demand the disclosure of exculpatory and 
other relevant material in possession of the prosecution.
272
 This applies to transferees 
according to Article 1 of the law on transfer of cases. On the other hand, the 
Rwandan Code of Criminal Procedure which applies to the locally accused does not 





Although it may be argued that the right to have these procedures extended to the 
locally accused may be inferred from the general provisions of Article 19 of the 
Rwandan Constitution on the right to a fair trial, the possibility of judges having 
such broad interpretation powers that have not so far been established in case law, is 
runcertain. It may be difficult to claim for redress in case such procedures are denied 
to the locally accused persons than it would be for the transferee. 
 
A form of contradiction also arises on how evidence should be given under LTC. It 
is provided that the High Court cannot convict a person (transferee) solely on written 
statements of witnesses who did not give oral evidence at trial.
274
 The provision 
however does not take into account the exceptions provided by the general 
provisions of rule 92 bis especially paragraph (C) of the ICTR Rules of Procedure 
where written statements may be admissible.
275
 The protection provided here 
supersedes what is provided by the ICTR but conforms to the Rwandan procedural 
law on Evidence production.  
 
The Rwandan law on evidence provides that „… evidence is based on all grounds, 
factual or legal provided that parties have been given a chance to be present for 
cross-examination.‟
276
  However, Article 14 bis of the law on transfer of cases 
further allows a different mode of testifying from what is provided for in laws that 
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apply to the locally accused.
277
 Here differential treatment cannot be raised but 
preferential treatment can be contested. This is because, by according such 
protection to the transferees and not extending it to other accused, shows preferential 
treatment. This position is supported by the European Court on Human Rights 
findings in Building Societies v the United Kingdom
278
 discussed in chapter three. 
6.  Witness protection 
 
Although Rwanda gives general protection to witnesses and has a victims and 
witness protection unit under the Public Prosecution Authority, in the case law, there 
is a preferential treatment of transferees‟ witnesses to those of the locally accused. 
The ICTR jurisprudence on referral; indicate that witnesses for transferees are 
exempted from being prosecuted for genocide ideology: in Hategekimana, the Trial 
Chamber considered Human Rights Watch„s submissions that Rwanda‟s campaign 
against genocide ideology is a threat to defence witnesses residing outside Rwanda, 
and hence held that it is  a bar to the referral.
279
  
On appeal, the government of Rwanda filed an amicus brief in which it gave an 
assurance to the defence witnesses stating that none of them would be charged for 
genocide ideology.
280
 This is contrary to article 9 of the Rwandan Penal Code, which 
provides that all Rwandans living abroad, and who may commit acts considered as 
crimes by Rwandan laws shall be prosecuted and judged by Rwandan courts.  
 
This also runs foul the ligalitäts prinzip (principle of legality) that demands 
mandatory prosecution of crimes where it has been conclusively established that a 
crime was committed, and general character of criminal law – which is that it applies 
to all.
281
  The status of being a witness for the transferee seems to extinguish the 
moral culpability and a relief of the duty to prosecute them, in cases where crimes 
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stated above are committed. In comparison, witnesses of the locally accused persons 
and anyone for that matter, in Rwanda, where there is a prima facie case that such 
crimes are committed, no protection can be claimed or extended to him/her. Thus, 
this does not only amount to direct discrimination but also violation principle of 
nullum crimen sine lege principle. 
7.  The right to counsel 
 
The right to a counsel of one‟s choice is guaranteed by the Constitution
282
 and by the 
law on transfer of cases.
283
 In Kanyarukiga referral, the government of Rwanda in its 
brief indicated that, it had solicited funds - 500,000 US dollars for legal assistance 
for those who would be transferred to Rwandan.
284
 However, in an interview held in 
2000 with prisoners‟ judicial committee, representing accused persons tried in 
Rwanda for genocide, the underlying concern was that they did not have proper 




Although this study was carried out almost 10 years ago and the fact that Rwanda 
has greatly improved its judicial system, resource constraints may still limit full 
realisation of this right. Failure to uphold this right then, and even now, could be due 
to financial constraints on the part of the government, and the big number of 
genocide suspects. Hence, considering the principle of „progressive realisation‟ 
under the ICESCR
286
 and the economic status of Rwanda, it could be justified. 
However, on the event that transferees will be afforded effective representation, a 
defence of lack of resources will no longer hold and as suggested by the CESCR, 
every effort should be made to use all resources that are at the State‟s disposition in 
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8.  Sentencing 
 
 Although there had been a moratorium for quite some time, in 2007 Rwanda passed 
a legislation abolishing the death penalty - a step that was applauded by the 
international community given the fact it was such a short time after genocide and so 
it was expected that the general public still approved of a severe punishment. The 
death penalty was substituted with life imprisonment or life imprisonment with 
special measures.
288
 Most applications for the transfer of cases to Rwandan 
jurisdiction were denied by both ICTR trial and appeals chambers due to the 
existence of life imprisonment with special measures which were said to be 




In what appears like a response/reaction to ICTR denials on requests for transfer, the 
Rwandan parliament passed an act amending the law on abolition of the death 
penalty. The law reads: „however, life imprisonment with special measures shall not 
be pronounced in respect of cases transferred to Rwanda from the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and from other states...‟
290
 Life imprisonment with 
special measures is, however, imposed on other accused persons appearing before 
Rwandan courts including those tried by Gacaca courts (who are said to bear the 
least responsibility compared to those tried by the ICTR).
291
  
Under Rwandan sentencing laws offenders who may have committed similar crimes 
may justifiably, be sentenced differently based on aggravating and mitigating 
circumstances. In this case however, it appears that being a transferee is a mitigating 
circumstance while not being one, could be a non - mitigating one. Even if one is not 
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a convert of the „just desert‟ theory of punishment, it is reasonable to say that the 
severity or less of it, of any form of punishment, be proportionate to the gravity of 
the crime committed.
292
 But LTC seems oblivious to such basic principle of criminal 
law. 
9.  Conditions of detention 
 
 The law on transfer of cases guarantees any person transferred to Rwanda to be 
detained in accordance with the minimum standards of detention as provided in 
United Nations Body of principles for the protection of all persons under any form of 
detention or imprisonment.
293
 A prison has been built specifically for this purpose in 
the southern part of the country and another in Kigali city.
294
 It is also provided that 
transferees in the preventive detention, inmates will be entitled to special meals.
295
 
Other detainees and prisoners in Rwanda however, do not have such guarantees.
296
 
The differentiation among the inmates of Rwandan prisons would have been justified 
in cases of sickness, age or safety of a particular prisoner that would be threatened 
when is treated or incarcerated with other prisoners. In this case, it is a matter of 




From the above discussion, it is apparent that LTC differentiates between the 
transferees and persons accused locally. To a limited extent, the distinction is 
justified on the ground of the legitimate aim, which Rwanda aims at when transfers 
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are effected. It is also justified by the principle of substantive rather than formal 
equality. Another justification that could be advanced on some guarantees could be 
that of resources and hence the principle of progressive realisation can as well be 
evoked. It is a sincere hope however, that some guarantees afforded only to the 
transferees especially where procedures do not require funds or any of the justified 
grounds discussed, be extended to cover every accused before Rwandan courts. 
 
To a larger extent, the basis or justification so far, seems to be whether one is a 
transferee or not. The status of being „a transferee‟ has not featured in grounds that 
justify differential treatment either under international or Rwandan law and so, the 
allegation is that the right to equality and non – discrimination is largely harmed by 































CHAPTER 5: IMPLICATION OF THE INEQUALITY PROMOTED UNDER 
THE LTC 
I.  Introduction 
 
It should be recalled that the ICTR‟s mission was to render justice by effectively 
redressing perpetration of crimes committed in Rwanda in 1994, restore and 
maintain peace, and ensure national reconciliation in Rwanda.
297
 In addition, by 
taking effective measures to bring to justice persons responsible for the serious 
human rights violations it envisaged deterring future offenders as earlier indicated. 
This chapter will show how this mission may not be achieved due to the inequalities 
promoted under LTC. I argue that, it fails deterrent and reconciliation motives and 
negatively affects concepts of consistency, public confidence in public institutions, 
legitimacy of decisions, and proportionality principles. 
II. Deterrence 
 
The wish of any sentencing institution as argued by Bentham is to prevent the 
occurrence of „like mischief in future.‟
298
 Thus, the Security Council that established 
the ICTR was no exception in this regard, just like the international community had 
decreed after the Jewish holocaust that; „never again‟.
299
 Deterrence is said to be of 
two kinds: individual and general deterrence. Individual deterrence is aimed at 
preventing a particular offender from re-offending and this can be achieved by taking 
from him/her the physical power of offending (by imprisonment or capital 





General deterrence on the other hand, is effected by the condemnation of the crime 
and application of punishment which, serves as an example and stops those of like 
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minds who would want to commit such crime.
301
 There is, however, a lot of debate 
whether; deterrence can in fact be achieved. Works of some researchers in the field 




As earlier indicated, the ICTR had a set of objectives among which was; preventing 
the reoccurrence of acts of genocide that had occurred in 1994 in the territory of 
Rwanda and elsewhere in the world.
303
 However, some people like Jackson 
Nyamuya think that those who advocate for deterrence would be frustrated by the 




Some of the identified factors that frustrate deterrent efforts are: the fact that the 
ICTR‟s indictees are just „a miniscule‟ fraction of the entire group of perpetrators of 
the 1994 Rwandan genocide and as argued, so many victims were killed because 
there were so many killers; the slowness of the ICTR in its trials, also defeats one of 
the underlying principles of deterrence theory that the application of any punishment 




The ICTR had also presumed that its indictees would easily be apprehended and 
probably be convicted to enable deterrent goals but the fact that some of its indictees 
are still at large, fails this assumption. Furthermore, the discretion of the ICTR 
judges, who give varied sentences to people convicted of similar crimes affects the 
principle of proportionality which then affects deterrence as discussed in Section IV 
below. The transfer of cases supposedly which should  come as a remedy to achieve 
deterrence, does not do better in view of the inequalities between transferees and the 
locally accused persons promoted under the LTC. This will be elaborated on later. 
 
Deterrence theory is premised on the assumption that crimes are committed due to 
the gains expected and that they are prevented when the costs in terms of punishment 
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are likely to be higher than the gains.
306
 This thinking is further supported by 
Richard Posner in his economic analysis of law. He asserts that crimes are 
committed because the expected economic benefits outweigh anticipated costs.
307
 
 Like the theory of retribution, when determining the quantum of punishment for a 
particular offender, deterrence theorists propose that „the greater the mischief of the 
offence‟, the greater should the costs (punishment) be.
308
  Posner speaks of marginal 
deterrence which requires that there be a big spread between the punishment for the 
least and most serious crimes.
309
 He further posits that if the maximum punishment 
for murder is life imprisonment, we may want to make armed robbery also 





This is premised on the reasoning that, if the criminal is to commit a crime, he/she is 
forced to choose the least, which would cost less in terms of punishment hence 
achieving deterrence on high or big crimes. This far, the legal regime on transfer and 
the ICTR sentencing practice, fall flat given that those who committed „biggest‟ 
crimes or greatest mischief to use Bentham‟s words will receive and from the ICTR 
jurisprudence have received the least (in terms of treatment and punishment), 
compared to the accused persons before Rwandan courts who committed the least of 
crimes or similar but do not receive similar treatment. If offenders were thus to 
choose in this case, as the theory suggests, they would choose to commit bigger 
crimes, hence no deterrence for high crimes. Analysing trials of  Rwandan genocide 
perpetrators, it as though one is better off, committing crimes that would put  him or 
her in category one, than those that would put him in category three due to the kind 
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Reconciliation was also one of the ICTR‟s objectives. Reconciliation has been 
defined as „renewal of applicable relations between persons who have been at 
variance.‟
311
 Gallimore further defines reconciliation as; restoring social 
relationships and reducing social tension due to past aggressive incidents.
312
 
Reconciliation is also defined as „a technique which goes beyond settling a conflict‟s 




When the ICTR was being established, it was expected that prosecution of 
perpetrators of genocide and other serious crimes committed in Rwanda, would 
promote reconciliation among the Rwandans.
314
 This view is also shared by the 
government of Rwanda. As a result, it established Gacaca Courts which aimed at 
reconciling the people of Rwanda by punishing perpetrators and encouraging plea 
bargains and asking for forgiveness.
315
 In the „media case‟
316
, the ICTR emphasised 
that its fundamental purpose is to hold individuals accountable for their conduct and 
that its intention is to „contribute to the process of national reconciliation and to 
restoration and maintenance of peace‟ and that „justice should serve as the beginning 




As earlier stated, the ICTR‟s real contribution to reconciliation is postulated because: 
firstly, as discussed in Chapter of this work, the ICTR is far situated from the 
victims, and so most of them do not know what the ICTR does; the acquittals of 
some of the ICTR accused who are believed to be key in the 1994 genocide is also 
setback; the ICTR in its operation, is concerned with the „accused‟ or its convicts, 
and not with the victims save when they are needed as witnesses; and disparity of 
punishments of those tried by the ICTR and those tried by the Rwandan courts and 
the  ICTR convicts, continue to deny responsibility, they insist on their innocence 
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and appeal against convictions and sentences.
318
 The LTC ought to correct this, but 
does not do any better due to the inequalities it carries, and this has negative 
implications on the basic principles of justice which are discussed below. 
IV. Equality 
 
There are various implications that inequality may have on other basic principles of 
justice 
a.  Consistency 
Discrimination affects consistency in the administration of justice. Equality is 
sometimes linked with consistency where fundamentally, like cases should be treated 
alike and different cases treated differently.
319
 Consistency is demanded by the ideal 
of equal justice.
320
 Analysing the nature of LTC and other sentencing laws in 
Rwanda highlighted in Chapter four, statutes are not harmonised and so harsh 
anomalies such as inequality have resulted. The principle of consistency proposes 
that „the distinction of some versus others should reflect genuine aspects of personal 
identity rather than extraneous features of the differentiating mechanism itself- in 
other words, the institutional mechanism in question should treat like cases alike and 




Lack of consistency in a criminal justice system undermines public confidence in 
such institutions. When principles of justice such as consistency and, equality 
operate ineffectively or not at all, confidence in society's institutions may be 
undermined.
322
 Yet, one of the goals of any sentencing system should be to foster the 
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Two researches carried out in Canada on the perception of inmates on disparity of 
sentences gives a hint on dangers of disparity. The authors of these studies noted 
that: „judges did not emerge with the offenders‟ confidence…it appears offenders do 
not operate under the assumption that the judge is neutral, objective arbiter, but 
instead they ascribe to him or her idiosyncratic decision-making and sentence 
formation.‟ 
324
 Perhaps this should be a lesson to both Rwanda and the ICTR judges 
because to assume that people‟s perception of their decisions is different, would be 
illusionary. This is not about clearing the judges‟ image though, it is about reversing 
the implications of what that perception would have, on reconciliation and 
deterrence. 
b.  Legitimacy 
 
In addition, equality or the lack of it, in public institutions determines legitimacy of 
any of their decisions. Fair procedures are central to the legitimacy of decisions 
reached and individual‟s acceptance of such decisions and  the laws themselves, 
should also be impartial so that they do not favour some people over others from the 
outset‟.
325
 Procedures are crucial in determining the quantum of punishment. As 
earlier discussed, transferees due to the high protections in the law, they are likely to 
get less sentences, serve sentence under better conditions of detention as provided in 
the law than other locally accused persons. It would therefore be naïve to expect all 
sentenced offenders to accept their particular sentences, when there is widespread 
cynicism toward a criminal justice system and so one should never hope to 
accomplish other goals such as reconciliation and deterrence as the ICTR and 
Rwanda had set out to achieve.  
c. Proportionality 
 
Inequality also affects the principle of proportionality in sentencing. On a just desert 
rationale, equality before the law at the sentencing stage is assured if the principle of 
proportionality is applied throughout sentencing, and if there are no significant 
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amounts of unaccountable discretion in practical sentencing.
326
 Just like Tallgren 
argues, „the role of punishment in conveying the blame- communicative theory, is 
distorted when punishment is not commensurate with the blameworthiness of the 
conduct.‟
327
 Whether one agrees with the deserts reasoning or not, the transfer 
regime is yet to account for the lighter sentences (for instance exempting them from 
solitary confinement) meant for the transferees-who are the master minders of the 
genocide than what is meant for the locally accused before Rwandan courts who are 
lowly charged, and those who commit ordinary crimes. 
 
As Tonry argues, „even if the community does not expect a sophisticated degree of 
proportionality in sentencing, it has a common sense concept of fairness which can 
be threatened by excessive disparity in sentencing.‟
328
 Offenders who have 
committed similar offences should receive similar punishment.
329
 But the LTC 
makes the status of being a transferee a justifying factor, to depart from this concept. 
 
V. General conclusion 
 
Despite the fact that there are various provisions both under international and 
Rwandan law protecting the right to equality and non-discrimination, and 
specifically, equality of punishment of all individuals accused of similar crimes, the 
accused persons in Rwanda will receive different penalties when transfers are 
effected under the LTC. This will depending on whether one is a transferee, or not. It 
is therefore inevitable for the researcher; not to compare the punishments inflicted on 
transferees (perpetrators of genocide) and those inflicted on ordinary criminals. In 
certain instances ordinary criminals may receive more severe penalties than the 
transferees and yet the crime of genocide according to the ICTR jurisprudence is 
considered as „a crime of crimes‟.
330
 Normally, genocide convicts ought to be 
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punished more severely than any ordinary criminals and not the reverse as may 
happen under the LTC. 
 
This should however not be interpreted as advocating for severity of punishment or 
suggesting to punish perpetrators of genocide more severely than they are now, to 
achieve deterrent results as it is rightly contested by the Kantian theory and several 
criminologists.
331
 Rather, I am advocating for equal treatment and punishing equally 
those accused of similar crimes, and differently, for those who committee different 
crimes and where differentiation is used, should be based on legally justified grounds 
discussed in chapter three. It is also not advocating for mechanical equal treatment of 
the accused but substantive equality. This  view is supported by Hood that, „...by 
„equality‟ we do not mean that each case can be exactly compared with another, and 
that decisions should be the same for cases „alike‟ in this sense. By „equality‟ we 
mean „equality of consideration‟, that is, that similar general considerations can be 




The main cause for differentiation of the accused on the one hand, seems to be due to 
the advantages the government of Rwanda expects from transfer of cases as 
discussed in chapter two, and on the other hand, it is due to the standards set by the 
ICTR before transfers can be effected. In certain instances Rwanda cannot correct 
the inequalities in the LTC without jeopardizing efforts at transfer – stakes are high. 
It appears from the ICTR decisions on transfer, that Rwanda has no choice but to 
agree to all the requirements as demanded by the ICTR and yet, practically it may 
not extend these requirements to all other accused persons before Rwandan courts. 
On the other hand, as stated by Canter, ICTR seems not ready to compromise its 
position, though according to the decisions on transfer, its judges do not have 
common position on what exactly these requirements are.  Yet, as the Trial Chamber 
in established in Gatete pointed out, no judicial system, be it national or 
international, can guarantee absolute protection and fair trial rights to the accused.
333
 
The ICTR in this regard may need to devise a new strategy on how transfers can be 
made to Rwanda.  For instance creating a chamber in Rwanda (where, international 
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and national judges adjudicate transferred cases), like that created in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. In this case, Rwanda may benefit from ICTR budget and human 
resource and hence ensure rights of the accused; while transferring cases, should take 
into account other accused persons in Rwanda, to avoid disparity of punishment and 
procedures of justice as this may be counter productive as discussed above.  
 
The transfer of cases to Rwanda, brings a lot of advantages and may in fact achieve 
both deterrence and reconciliation as discussed in chapter two, if the implied 
discrimination promoted under LTC is corrected. Transfer of cases would help to 
achieve deterrent goals as mimetic structures of violence discussed by Gallimore 
earlier may be destroyed 
334
 where those who planned the genocide would be 
punished at home, and hence cease to be „heroes‟ to the population.  Reconciliation 
would also be achieved since victims of genocide would be able to see their 
perpetrators punished as this has been a long time wish for them. This is unlike 
judgments handed in Arusha that for all intents and purposes are remote to them. 
Trials organised and conducted by Rwandan courts, are better placed to ensure 
reconciliation than those externally designated by the ICTR.
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 The ICTR‟s final 
contribution to Rwanda‟s reconciliation as Gallimore asserts, would be to enable the 
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